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ABSTRACT 
Over the past decade or so, the Supreme Court has issued an 
extraordinary and highly controversial series of decisions concerning the scope 
of Congress’s power.  Yet beneath the surface of the debate over the 
federalism cases lies a parallel dispute that has received far less academic 
notice.  This dispute concerns the proper mode of judicial review in cases testing the 
scope of congressional power.  The uncertainty is greatest in the Commerce 
Clause area, where the Court’s recent cases—including its 2005 decision in 
Gonzales v. Raich—have shown a strong preference for facial challenges, in 
sharp contrast to the Court’s traditional inclination toward as-applied review.  
This article explores several possible rationales for the Court’s use of facial 
review in Commerce Clause cases, and concludes that the soundest 
explanation lies in an understanding of the Clause’s meaning that incorporates 
a requirement of appropriate legislative purpose. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Facial challenges are in the news. 
The foregoing sentence is, of course, an exaggeration.  In truth, the 
question of whether statutes ought to be challenged as unconstitutional on 
their face or merely as applied to particular facts is one that only a lawyer could 
love.  The general public remains largely—and no doubt blissfully—unaware 
of the question.  Nevertheless, a series of high-profile events over the past year 
has brought the issue of facial challenges back into prominence for judges and 
scholars, across several domains of constitutional law.  Consider: 
Abortion rights. During the confirmation hearings of Justice Samuel A. 
Alito, Jr., in January 2006, the nominee’s critics focused a great deal of 
attention on his partial dissent in the Third Circuit’s 1991 Casey case, which 
later became the Supreme Court’s 1992 Casey case.1 (They thought, probably 
correctly, that Alito’s opinion indicated his general opposition to abortion 
rights.)  In that opinion, Judge Alito voted to uphold Pennsylvania’s spousal 
notification statute.  Noting that the plaintiffs had launched a facial challenge 
against the statute, Judge Alito reasoned that “proof that the provision would 
adversely affect an unknown number of women with a particular combination 
of characteristics could not suffice” to demonstrate its unconstitutionality.2
The Supreme Court pointedly rejected Judge Alito’s reasoning on this issue.3
Later in January 2006, the Supreme Court directly confronted the question of 
facial challenges in the abortion rights context.4 The First Circuit had facially 
invalidated a New Hampshire parental notification statute because it did not 
contain a health exception.  In Sandra Day O’Connor’s valedictory opinion as 
a justice, the Court unanimously remanded to allow the lower courts to fashion 
a narrower remedy, and expressed a strong preference for as-applied rather 
than facial invalidation.  “Generally speaking,” said the Court, “when 
confronting a constitutional flaw in a statute, we try to limit the solution to the 
 
1 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991), aff’d 
in part & rev’d in part, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
2 Id. at 722 n.1 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
3 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887-98 (1992). 
4 Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 126 S. Ct. 961 (2006). 




Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority. In January 2006, in United 
States v. Georgia, the Supreme Court upheld Title II of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act6 as applied to a disabled inmate in a state prison.7 In a brief 
and unanimous opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court assumed that the 
allegations in the inmate’s complaint were sufficient to state valid claims under 
the Eighth Amendment, and held on that basis that Title II, as applied to those 
allegations, was a valid exercise of Congress’s power to abrogate state 
sovereign immunity under Section 5 of Fourteenth Amendment.  This ruling 
followed a similar holding in the 2004 case of Tennessee v. Lane, which upheld 
Title II as applied to the denial of the fundamental right of disabled individuals 
to gain access to the courts.8 The Georgia and Lane decisions marked a 
departure from a series of cases beginning in 1997 in which the Court 
invalidated—apparently on their face—several federal statutes on the ground 
that they exceeded Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement 
authority.9
Commerce Clause authority. During the confirmation hearings of Chief 
Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., in September 2005, the nominee’s critics focused 
a great deal of attention on then-Judge Roberts’s brief separate opinion in 
what became widely known as the “hapless toad case.”10 (They thought, 
probably incorrectly, that Judge Roberts’s opinion indicated he would vote to 
 
5 Id. at 967.  Distinguishing the 2000 case of Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000), 
in which the Court struck down a Nebraska statute on its face for failure to include a health 
exception, the Court noted simply that “the parties in Stenberg did not ask for, and we did not 
contemplate, relief more finely drawn.”  Ayotte, 126 S. Ct. at 969.  The following week, the 
Court issued a similar opinion concerning campaign finance, remanding to allow the lower 
courts to entertain an as-applied challenge to the McCain-Feingold statute.  See Wisconsin 
Right to Life v. FEC, 126 S. Ct. 1016 (2006) (per curiam). 
6 42 U. S. C. § 12131 et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. II 2002). 
7 126 S. Ct. 877 (2006). 
8 541 U.S. 509 (2004). 
9 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. 
Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid 
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 
62 (2000); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 
(2001).  But see Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).  The Court has also 
expressed a reluctance to entertain facial challenges in cases challenging exercises of 
Congress’s Spending Clause authority.  See Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609-10 (2004); 
Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997). 
10 Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Roberts, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).   
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strike down the Endangered Species Act as exceeding Congress’s Interstate 
Commerce Clause power.)  In that opinion, Judge Roberts construed the 
Supreme Court’s precedents to mean that “a facial challenge can succeed only 
if there are no circumstances in which the Act at issue can be applied without 
violating the Commerce Clause.”11 Earlier in 2005, in Gonzales v. Raich,12 the 
Court had upheld against Commerce Clause challenge the application of the 
federal Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) to medicinal users of marijuana 
within California who either cultivated their own cannabis or obtained it for 
free from within the state.13 Although the Court itself characterized Raich as 
an as-applied challenge, its reasoning and result strongly suggested that as-
applied challenges under the Commerce Clause will not receive a friendly 
reception at the Court.  Indeed, Raich has already been described as putting an 
end to the short-lived flowering of such challenges in the lower courts.14 
This recent burst of attention to the issue of facial challenges will no 
doubt spark discussion and debate among scholars and practitioners on a 
number of fronts.  But it is the Court’s Commerce Clause cases—and Raich in 
particular—that stand out, because they pose several unanswered questions.  
How can we explain the seemingly paradoxical fact that the Court’s earlier 
decisions in United States v. Lopez15 and United States v. Morrison,16 which 
vindicated facial challenges under the Commerce Clause, ended up unleashing 
a torrent of as-applied challenges in the lower courts,17 while Raich, which dealt 
with an as-applied challenge, ended up cementing the Court’s commitment to 
facial review?  Why do justices such as Antonin Scalia who oppose broad use 
of facial challenges in cases involving individual rights appear to favor it in 
cases involving congressional power, while justices such as John Paul Stevens 
 
11 Id. at 1160. 
12 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). 
13 Id. 
14 See Glenn H. Reynolds & Brandon P. Denning, What Hath Raich Wrought? Five 
Takes, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 915, 918 (2005) (“Whatever the effects of Raich on lower 
courts … one thing is clear: the as-applied challenges to which lower courts had been warming 
are likely over.”); Randy Barnett, Foreword: Limiting Raich, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 743 
(2005). 
15 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 as 
beyond Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause). 
16 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating the civil remedy provisions of the Violence 
Against Women Act as beyond Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause). 
17 See Glenn H. Reynolds & Brandon P. Denning, Rulings and Resistance: The New 
Commerce Clause Jurisprudence Encounters the Lower Courts, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1253 (2003) (noting 
that lower courts treated Lopez and Morrison as invitations to engage in as-applied review). 
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who favor broader use of facial challenges in individual rights cases appear to 
oppose it in congressional power cases?  And, most central to this article: 
Given the Court’s recent reaffirmations of its general preference for as-applied 
constitutional challenges—even in areas like Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment18 and abortion rights,19 where earlier decisions had seemed to 
embrace one form or another of facial review20—why does the Court favor 
facial challenges in Commerce Clause cases?  This article offers answers to 
those questions. 
The argument proceeds in three stages.  Part I frames the issue by 
describing the Court’s recent federalism decisions and revealing that beneath 
the surface of the contentious debate over the substance of judicial doctrine 
lies an equally thorny set of questions involving the appropriateness of facial 
challenges in cases testing the scope of Congress’s power.  These questions are 
particularly difficult in the context of the Commerce Clause, where the 
Supreme Court’s recent decisions have suggested a strong preference for facial 
challenges, in sharp contrast to the Court’s traditional inclination toward as-
applied review. 
Part II lays the theoretical groundwork for answering those questions 
by explaining the distinction between facial and as-applied challenges, as well 
as the crucial but underappreciated distinction between two types of facial 
challenge: the overbreadth facial challenge and the valid-rule facial challenge.21 
18 United States v. Georgia, 126 S. Ct. 877 (2006). 
19 Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 126 S. Ct. 961 (2006). 
20 For apparently facial invalidations under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
see Boerne, 521 U.S. at 511, 532-33; Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 646-68; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 82-83, 
86-91; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 601, 613; Garrett, 531 U.S. at 373-74.  For an apparently facial 
validation under Section 5, see Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 735-40. Tennessee v. Lane seemed to mark the 
Justices’ dawning awareness that review under Section 5 need not be facial.  In an amusing 
moment from the oral argument in Lane, Justice Breyer asked counsel for the State how a 
court could declare a statute facially invalid as exceeding Congress’s Section 5 authority.  
Justice Scalia retorted: “Justice Breyer’s question, how can you do that, reminds me of, you 
know, there’s a story about the Baptist minister who was asked whether he believed in total 
immersion baptism, and he said, believe in it, I’ve seen it done.”  Tennessee v. Lane, transcript 
of oral argument, 2004 WL 136390, at *13 (Jan. 13, 2004) (No. 02-1667).  For an illuminating 
discussion of facial challenges and federalism that emphasizes the Section 5 cases, see Gillian 
E. Metzger, Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105 COLUM. L .REV. 873 (2005). 
For facial invalidations involving abortion rights, see, e.g., Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 922; 
Casey, 505 U.S. at 887-98. 
21 I borrow these terms from Marc Isserles’s insightful article on the topic of facial 
challenges.  See Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule 
Requirement, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 359 (1998).  For a thought-provoking application of Isserles’s 
taxonomy in the administrative law context, see Stuart Buck, Salerno vs. Chevron: What to do 
About Statutory Challenges, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 427 (2003). 
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Briefly put, an overbreadth facial challenge argues that a statute is 
unconstitutional on its face because it sweeps within its coverage an 
unacceptably large proportion of constitutionally unregulable activities.22 By 
contrast, a valid-rule facial challenge argues that a statute is invalid on its face 
because of a constitutional infirmity that inheres in the statute as written, 
regardless of the facts or circumstances surrounding particular applications.23
This Part argues next that scholars have erred by analyzing all facial challenges 
as if they were of the overbreadth as opposed to the valid-rule variety.  That 
misimpression, Part II explains, has led to two further errors: an overemphasis 
on statutory severability as the key factor in determining whether facial review 
is appropriate, and an assumption that facial review is called for if and only if 
the constitutional claimant expressly frames her challenge in facial terms.24
Rather, the appropriateness of facial challenges—particularly valid-rule facial 
challenges—is a function of the interaction between the challenged statute and 
the applicable substantive constitutional doctrine. 
Building on this groundwork, Part III examines the possible rationales 
for the Court’s use of facial review in Commerce Clause cases.  First, this Part 
canvasses the Court’s case law concerning the proper mode of judicial review 
in Commerce Clause cases and concludes that no consistent pattern emerges 
from the precedential record: facial review, though discernable in earlier eras, 
has become predominant in the Court’s jurisprudence only since Lopez. Next, 
Part III explores several accounts of substantive constitutional meaning or 
judicial doctrine that could plausibly explain the Court’s turn to the facial 
perspective in Commerce Clause cases.  It examines, in turn, a formalist 
conception that characterizes rights as zones of privileged conduct while 
envisioning government power as extending to the limits of its internally 
 
22 Overbreadth facial challenges, at least in the First Amendment area, are also 
characterized in practice by the requirement that the claimant’s own activity be constitutionally 
regulable.  See infra text accompanying note 72.  I do not view this requirement as essential to 
the definition of an overbreadth facial challenge, or to the distinction between overbreadth 
and valid-rule facial challenges. 
23 See infra Part II.A-B for a more detailed discussion of the distinction between 
overbreadth facial challenges and valid-rule facial challenges. 
24 This article uses the phrase “constitutional claimant” (or simply “claimant”) to 
refer to any person challenging the constitutional validity of an action taken against her by the 
government.  Traditionally in American law, the classic constitutional claimant was a 
defendant, facing criminal or other enforcement action brought by the government and 
seeking to interpose a constitutional claim as a defense.  In recent decades, however, with the 
rise of actions for injunctive and declaratory relief, it has become commonplace for 
constitutional claims to be advanced by plaintiffs.  And because this article focuses on 
challenges to the scope of congressional power rather than individual rights challenges, a term 
such as “right-holder” would be inappropriate.  Hence the neutral term “claimant.” 
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defined scope; an understanding of the interstate commerce power as plenary 
or judicially unconstrained; and a conception of the Commerce Clause as 
including a prohibition on overbreadth.  It concludes, however, that these 
rationales do not adequately account for the Court’s resort to facial review.  
Instead, Part III demonstrates that the soundest explanation for the Court’s 
turn to facial review in Commerce Clause cases lies in an understanding of the 
Clause’s meaning that incorporates a requirement of appropriate legislative 
purpose.  Part III concludes by setting forth and then responding to 
descriptive, normative, and theoretical objections to this purpose-based 
conception of the commerce power. 
I.  FRAMING THE ISSUE: UNANSWERED QUESTIONS 
Over the past decade or so, the Supreme Court has issued an 
extraordinary series of decisions concerning the scope of Congress’s power.  
In the wake of the Court’s 1995 ruling constraining the scope of the Interstate 
Commerce Clause in Lopez25—and particularly after its even more ambitious 
holding in Morrison26—it appeared to many that the Rehnquist Court had 
sparked a “federalism revolution.”27 Additional cases restricting Congress’s 
power to regulate state government officials,28 Congress’s power to abrogate 
state sovereign immunity,29 and Congress’s power to legislate pursuant to its 
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power30 all gave added ammunition to 
the charge that the Court was revolutionizing the constitutional law of 
 
25 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
26 529 U.S. 598 (2000).  Morrison was a more ambitious holding than Lopez because, 
unlike the Gun-Free School Zones Act, the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) was 
supported by detailing congressional findings concerning the effect of the regulated activity on 
the national economy.  In addition, VAWA was arguably an appropriate exercise of Congress’s 
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority, as it aimed to remedy gender-based inequities 
in the criminal justice systems of the states. 
27 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Federalism Revolution, 31 N.M. L. REV. 7 (2001); 
Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV.
1045, 1053 (2001) (discussing the “constitutional revolution we are living through”); Thomas 
W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS L. J. 
569, 618 (2003) (discussing “the federalism revolution of the second Rehnquist Court”); J. 
Harvie Wilkinson III, Our Structural Constitution, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1687, 1690 (2004) 
(discussing “the federalism revolution of the Rehnquist Court”).   
28 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 
898 (1997). 
29 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 
(1999). 
30 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. 
Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999);  Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 
62 (2000); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619-27; Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).  




More recently, however, the picture has become blurred, as the Court 
has handed down several decisions curtailing, or at least failing to follow 
through on, its most adventurous federalism projects.31 The result has at times 
seemed closer to confusion than revolution; discerning a pattern behind the 
Court’s decisions on the scope of federal power is a difficult task.  Indeed, it 
would not be absurd to surmise that some federalism-minded members of the 
Court—including the recently retired Justice O’Connor—simply said “thus far 
and no further,” without supplying a compelling theory to explain their chosen 
stopping point.32 As of this writing, it is far too early to tell whether the 
replacements of the late Chief Justice Rehnquist by John Roberts and Justice 
O’Connor by Samuel Alito will lend a new spark to the movement to restrict 
federal power. 
All of this—the seeming “federalism revolution” and its apparent 
petering-out of late—has been the subject of sustained scholarly attention.33 
Yet beneath the surface of the primary confusion of the federalism holdings, a 
secondary confusion has persisted on the Court without receiving nearly as 
much academic notice.  This secondary confusion concerns the proper mode of 
judicial review in cases testing the scope of congressional power.  In particular, 
the justices of the Supreme Court—and increasingly after Lopez, judges on the 
lower federal courts—appear to be uncertain about whether challenges to the 
scope of Congress’s power ought to be reviewed on a “facial” or an “as-
applied” basis. 
The confusion is at its greatest in the Commerce Clause area.34 The 
 
31 Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 
U.S. 721 (2003); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004); Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). 
32 In light of Raich, Brandon Denning and Glenn Reynolds have complained that we 
are stuck with an “Emily Litella Court,” after the Gilda Radner character from the early years 
of Saturday Night Live who would regularly kvetch about some topic or other, only to 
eventually say, “Never mind.”  Denning & Reynolds, supra note 14, at 919. 
33 On the federalism revolution, see, e.g., the authorities cited supra note 27. On the 
petering-out, see, e.g., Bradley W. Joondeph, The Deregulatory Valence of Justice O’Connor’s 
Federalism (forthcoming 2006) (on file with author); M. Elizabeth Magill, The Revolution That 
Wasn’t, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 47, 47 (2004); Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two 
Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2004); Ann Althouse, Inside the Federalism Cases: Concern About the 
Federal Courts, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 132, 142 (2001) (“Despite the clamor 
over the Court’s new federalism doctrine, it has in fact only modestly trimmed congressional 
power.”). 
34 There seems to be a movement toward as-applied review with respect to other 
sources of federal authority, such as Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
Spending Clause.  See, e.g., Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (Section 5); Georgia, 126 S. Ct. 877 (Section 5); 
Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609-10 (2004) (Spending Clause); Salinas v. United States, 
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Court decided the groundbreaking Lopez case on a facial basis: Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s majority opinion invalidated the Gun-Free School Zones Act for 
all purposes and in all circumstances—and showed virtually no interest in the 
particular facts of the case at bar.35 Likewise, in Morrison, the Court invalidated 
the civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act on its face, 
without pausing to inquire whether the particular act of gender-motivated 
violence at issue in the case before it, or other such acts that might have arisen 
in subsequent cases, could have had a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce.36 Moreover, in both cases, the Court emphasized that the 
challenged statute lacked a “jurisdictional element”—that is, a saving clause on 
the face of the law which would require the constitutionally requisite 
connection to interstate commerce to be pleaded and proven in every action 
brought thereunder.37 The Court apparently reasoned that the presence of a 
jurisdictional element would ensure the facial validity of the challenged 
statute,38 such that the only available “as-applied challenge” to such a statute—
if one could call it that—would be an argument that the statute did not apply 
 
522 U.S. 52 (1997) (Spending Clause); see generally Metzger, supra note 20.  On the other side of 
the equation, the Court appears unreflectively to apply facial review in cases involving the 
separation of powers and the “anti-commandeering” doctrine.  See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New 
York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (separation of powers); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) 
(separation of powers); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (anti-commandeering); 
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (anti-commandeering). 
35 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-61 (describing the categories of activity that Congress is 
permitted to regulate under the Commerce Clause and concluding that possession of guns 
near schools is not such an activity).  See Metzger, supra note 20 (describing Lopez and Morrison 
as facial invalidations).  As Metzger notes, see id. at 907, the Court in Lopez does mention in a 
summary paragraph that “[r]espondent was a local student at a local school; there is no 
indication that he had recently moved in interstate commerce,” 514 U.S. at 567, but nothing in 
the opinion appears to turn on this observation, which is therefore probably best read as not 
detracting from the facial character of the rest of the Court’s opinion. 
36 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608-09, 613-19 (reiterating from Lopez the categories of 
activity that Congress is permitted to regulate under the Commerce Clause and concluding 
that violence against women is not such an activity). 
37 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (“§ 922(q) contains no jurisdictional element which 
would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects 
interstate commerce.”); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (“§ 13981 contains no jurisdictional element 
establishing that the federal cause of action is in pursuance of Congress’ power to regulate 
interstate commerce.”). 
38 For instance, the post-Lopez version of the Gun-Free School Zones Act, which 
does contain a jurisdictional element, 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(q)(2)(A), has been upheld in the lower 
courts.  United States v. Danks, 221 F.3d 1037 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Dorsey, 418 
F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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to the facts of a particular case, simply as a matter of statutory construction.39 
Relatedly, in subsequent cases, the Court has avoided direct confrontation with 
the Commerce Clause by construing statutes narrowly to avoid potential 
doubts about whether they exceed Congress’s regulatory power.40
Not surprisingly, Lopez and Morrison unleashed a torrent of Commerce 
Clause challenges in the lower courts.  And, also understandably, in many of 
these cases—particularly the criminal ones—constitutional claimants argued 
that federal statutes exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause authority both on 
their face and as applied.  What is rather surprising is that some lower courts 
took Lopez and Morrison as an invitation to invalidate federal statutes on 
Commerce Clause grounds, but only as applied to the claimant and others similarly 
situated.41 For example, in 2001 the Sixth Circuit held that the federal child 
pornography statute exceeded the federal commerce power as applied to a 
defendant who took pictures of a minor who was nearly 18 years old, where 
the photographer did not intend to distribute the pictures to others.42 
Likewise, in 2003 the Ninth Circuit invalidated the same statute as applied to 
“simple intrastate possession of a visual depiction (or depictions) that has not 
been mailed, shipped, or transported interstate and is not intended for 
interstate distribution, or for any economic or commercial use, including the 
exchange of the prohibited material for other prohibited material.”43 The 
Eleventh Circuit followed suit, striking down the child pornography statute as 
applied to intrastate possession of child pornography where the diskettes on 
 
39 The converse of the proposition in the text, however, is not true; that is, the 
absence of a jurisdictional element does not doom a statute to facial invalidity.  See Sabri, 541 
U.S. at 605 (“We simply do not presume the unconstitutionality of federal criminal statutes 
lacking explicit provision of a jurisdictional hook…”); see also United States v. Ho, 311 F.3d 
589, 604-05 (5th Cir. 2002); Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1068; United States v. Morales-DeJesus, 
372 F.3d 6, 14 (1st Cir. 2004).  
40 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 529 U.S. 848 (2000) (holding, in order to avoid 
constitutional doubts, that a residence not used for any commercial purpose is not covered by 
the federal arson statute); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (holding, in order to avoid constitutional doubts, that the 
definition of “navigable waters” under the Clean Water Act does not include intrastate waters 
used as habitat by migratory birds). 
41 See generally Reynolds & Denning, supra note 17 (noting that lower courts treated 
Lopez and Morrison as invitations to engage in as-applied review).  In such cases, courts 
struggled with the question of how to characterize the appropriate activity or subclass for 
purposes of as-applied review.  For a helpful and engaging guide to that question, see John 
Copeland Nagle, The Commerce Clause Meets the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly, 97 MICH. L. REV.
174 (1998). 
42 United States v. Corp, 236 F.3d 325 (6th Cir. 2001). 
43 United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1115 (9th Cir. 2003).   
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which the pornography was copied traveled in interstate commerce before 
they contained the images in question.44
The Ninth Circuit soon reaffirmed its as-applied approach to the 
Commerce Clause in holding that the federal prohibition on machine gun 
possession was unconstitutional as applied to the possession of a homemade 
machine gun made partly out of ready-made parts that had traveled in 
interstate commerce and partly out of parts the defendant had machined 
himself.45 “[T]he Supreme Court has always entertained as-applied challenges 
under the Commerce Clause,” wrote Judge Kozinski.  “Indeed, it is hard to 
believe the Court would ever eliminate as-applied challenges for one particular 
area of constitutional law.”46 And, of course, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
the Raich case, later reversed by the Supreme Court, was an as-applied 
invalidation of the Controlled Substances Act under the Commerce Clause.47 
Adding to the confusion, in the years following Lopez and Morrison 
several lower courts upheld statutes against Commerce Clause attack, but only 
as applied, reserving for future litigation the question whether the statute could 
validly be enforced in other circumstances.  Thus, in 2003 the Fifth Circuit 
upheld the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) as applied to the “Cave Species,” 
several endangered arachnids and insects threatened by the activities of a real 
estate developer.48 Similarly, in 2003 the D.C. Circuit upheld the ESA as 
applied to a real estate developer’s proposed housing project, which the United 
States Fish and Wildlife Service concluded jeopardized the continued existence 
of the arroyo southwestern toad.49  And the Tenth Circuit, in April 2005, 
upheld the federal child pornography statute as applied to a defendant who 
transported boys across state lines for illicit photography for which they were 
compensated.50 In that case, Judge McConnell maintained that “[t]he existence 
 
44 United States v. Maxwell, 386 F.3d 1042 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, vacated and 
remanded, 126 S. Ct. 321 (2005).  See also United States v. Smith, 402 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2005), 
cert. granted, vacated and remanded, 125 S. Ct. 2938 (2005) (invalidating federal child pornography 
statute as applied to intrastate production and possession). 
45 United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, vacated and 
remanded, 125 S. Ct. 2899 (2005). 
46 Id. at 1141, 1142. 
47 Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th. Cir. 2003), rev’d sub. nom. Gonzales v. Raich, 
125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). 
48 GDF Realty Invs. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 
2898 (2005). 
49 Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003), reh’g en banc denied,
334 F.3d 1158 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1218 (2004). 
50 United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852 (10th Cir., Apr 19, 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. 
Ct. 299 (2005). 
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and coherence of ‘as applied’ challenges under the Commerce Clause 
necessarily presupposes that the constitutionality of some applications of a 
facially valid statute will, and some will not, have sufficient nexus to interstate 
commerce, and that this will be based on the particular facts of the case.”51
By contrast, other lower court judges, post-Lopez/Morrison, suggested 
that Commerce Clause review should always—or nearly always—be facial in 
nature.  For instance, Judge Trott of the Ninth Circuit dissented from an as-
applied invalidation of the child pornography statute, contending that facial 
challenges were de rigueur in Commerce Clause cases: “Congress has declared 
that an entire class of activities substantially affects interstate commerce.  That 
activity is child pornography.  To the statute, it is immaterial that the particular 
child pornography under scrutiny was not produced for sale or trade.”52 Judge 
Trott suggested that the panel majority’s ostensibly as-applied disposition 
made sense only if understood either as (a) an act of statutory interpretation 
holding that the statute did not to apply to interstate non-commercial 
possession, or (b) in effect a facial invalidation of the statute on grounds of 
overbreadth.53 And on the Third Circuit, then-Judge Alito appeared to argue 
in a dissent that the federal machine gun possession statute was invalid on its 
face, owing to its lack of either a jurisdictional element or legislative findings 
showing a link between intrastate possession of machine guns and interstate 
commerce.54 
Then came Raich, in which the Court appeared (at least at first glance) 
to take a sharp turn away from its previous facial approach to the Commerce 
Clause.  Justice Stevens’s majority opinion took pains to characterize Raich as 
an as-applied challenge, distinct from the facial challenges entertained in Lopez 
 
51 Id. at 869.  See also, e.g., United States v. Ho, 311 F.3d 589 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied,
539 U.S. 914 (2003) (upholding certain provisions of the Clean Air Act and their implementing 
regulations as applied to defendant’s circumvention of asbestos abatement requirements). 
52 McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1141 (Trott, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
53 Id. at 1140 (Trott, J., dissenting). 
54 United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 287 (3d Cir. 1996) (Alito, J., dissenting), cert. 
denied, 522 U.S. 807 (1997).  Alito dissented from an opinion that appeared to uphold the 
machine gun statute on its face.  Id. at 276-85.  See generally Nathaniel Stewart, Note, Turning the 
Commerce Clause on its Face: Why Federal Commerce Clause Statutes Demand Facial Challenges, 55 CASE 
WESTERN L. REV. 161 (2004) (asserting that text and structure of Commerce Clause 
necessitate judicial inquiry into classes of activities rather than claimant’s particular conduct). 
To add further perplexity to the mix, at least one lower court judge argued that as-
applied challenges are sometimes available under the Commerce Clause, but only where the facts 
being used to distinguish the claimant’s case are not facts that go to the economic or 
commercial nature of the claimant’s conduct.  See United States v. Morales-DeJesus, 372 F.3d 6, 
17-20 (1st Cir. 2004) (Lipez, J., dissenting). 




Here, respondents ask us to excise individual applications of a 
concededly valid statutory scheme.  In contrast, in both Lopez 
and Morrison, the parties asserted that a particular statute or 
provision fell outside Congress’ commerce power in its 
entirety.  This distinction is pivotal for we have often reiterated 
that where the class of activities is regulated and that class is 
within the reach of federal power, the courts have no power to 
excise, as trivial, individual instances of the class.55 
But the Court’s insistence that it was sidestepping facial review in Raich rang 
hollow.  In reality, the Court refused to take meaningful account of the 
particular nature or extent of the respondents’ activities, or of the “subclass” 
of conduct carved out by the Ninth Circuit and by California law, saying only 
that Congress could rationally view the subclass as an essential part of a 
comprehensive regulatory scheme.56 Moreover, the outcome in the case—
upholding the federal drug trafficking statute even as applied to the 
respondents, while declining to overrule Lopez or Morrison—strongly suggests 
that the Court simply disfavors as-applied challenges altogether in the 
Commerce Clause area.57 After all, if the Raich claimants, whose activities were 
neither interstate nor commercial, could not launch a successful as-applied 
challenge to an otherwise valid statute, it stands to reason that virtually no one 
can.  Raich is, in essence, a facial validation of the Controlled Substances Act for 
Commerce Clause purposes. 
In short, Lopez, Morrison, and Raich all resulted in facial adjudications, 
an outcome that clashes with the Court’s usual preference for as-applied 
review.  Why was a majority of the Court in Raich unwilling to engage in as-
applied invalidation, a disposition that is familiar and regularly employed in 
many areas of constitutional law?  And—perhaps even more puzzlingly, in 
light of the Court’s subsequent decisions upholding exercises of Congress’s 
Section 5 authority as applied in Lane and Georgia—why was the majority in 
Lopez and Morrison unwilling even to entertain the possibility that the statutes 
challenged in those cases could be upheld as applied in particular 
circumstances, say, on the grounds that a particular gun carried near a school 
 
55 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2209 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  The 
Court attempted to explain its divergence from its prior facial approach in terms of the 
arguments made by the parties, but the explanation seems incomplete, if not disingenuous.  As 
I explain infra Part II.C, the choice between facial and as-applied review does not turn on the 
way in which a claimant frames her challenge. 
56 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2211-12. 
57 See supra text accompanying notes 12-14. 
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has traveled in interstate commerce (as the vast majority of guns no doubt 
have)58 or that a particular gender-based assault could substantially affect 
interstate commerce? 
This article provides answers to these vexing questions.  But first some 
theoretical groundwork must be laid. 
II. AS-APPLIED CHALLENGES, OVERBREADTH FACIAL CHALLENGES, AND 
VALID-RULE FACIAL CHALLENGES 
A.  The distinction between as-applied and facial challenges. 
The conventional account of the distinction between facial vs. as-
applied challenges begins with the simple observation that a constitutional 
claimant may challenge the constitutionality of a statute in two ways.  She can 
challenge the validity of the statute “on its face”—that is, she can argue that 
the statute as a whole is unconstitutional as written or authoritatively 
construed.59 Alternatively, she can challenge the validity of the statute “as 
applied”—that is, she can argue that the statute produced an unconstitutional 
result when it was applied to her.60 Typically, facial and as-applied challenges 
are not mutually exclusive options for a constitutional claimant: with one 
important exception to be mentioned shortly, the same claimant in the same 
case can generally launch both facial and as-applied challenges to the same 
statute.61 
Given that federal courts insist upon a concrete “case or controversy” 
before exercising jurisdiction and are reluctant to invalidate any more of a 
legislature’s handiwork than is necessary, the as-applied mode of judicial 
review has traditionally been the predominant one.62 To understand the classic 
 
58 See Harry Litman & Mark D. Greenberg, Federal Power and Federalism: A Theory of 
Commerce-Clause Based Regulation of Traditionally State Crimes, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 921, 953 
(1997) (“Most guns are manufactured in one of two states and are then shipped to other 
states.”). 
59 The phrasing here is inevitably somewhat imprecise: a claimant could launch a 
“facial” challenge without arguing that an entire statute is invalid.  A facial challenge can allege 
the invalidity of a particular statutory provision.  The important point is that the challenged 
provision’s constitutional validity would be adjudicated without reference to the particular 
facts of the claimant’s situation. 
60 Or, in the case of a pre-enforcement challenge, that the statute will produce an 
unconstitutional result as soon as it is applied to her in the future.  The distinction between 
facial and as-applied challenges bears no necessary relation to the distinction between pre– and 
post-enforcement challenges. 
61 The exception is First Amendment overbreadth, discussed infra at text 
accompanying notes 65-72. 
62 See, e.g., Ayotte, 126 S. Ct. at 967-69 (explaining the Court’s general preference for 
as-applied invalidation, on grounds of judicial restraint, administrability, and legislative intent). 
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idea of an as-applied challenge, imagine a statute that makes it a crime to 
disturb the peace.  A flag-burning antiwar protester charged with violating this 
hypothetical statute would be best served to argue that the statute violates his 
constitutional rights as applied.  While the disturbing-the-peace statute might 
be perfectly constitutional on its face,63 he would argue that its application to 
him, a peaceful protester engaged in “symbolic speech,” violates his First 
Amendment rights.64 
Because the as-applied mode of review makes such a natural fit with 
traditional federal-court principles of justiciability and judicial restraint, it is 
only in the past half-century or so that the distinction between facial and as-
applied challenges has become a major focus of judicial and academic debate.  
The issue rose to prominence in the context of the First Amendment, and 
more particularly in the context of an exception to as-applied review known as 
the overbreadth doctrine.  I shall argue later that the overbreadth doctrine 
does not represent the most important type of facial challenge, but because for 
many judges and scholars overbreadth is the paradigm for all facial challenges, 
it is worth addressing first and in some detail. 
The 1981 case of Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim nicely illustrates the 
doctrine of overbreadth.65 In Schad, a city had enacted an ordinance 
prohibiting all live entertainment in any commercial zone.66 The operators of 
an adult bookstore that offered coin-operated booths featuring nude dancers 
challenged the statute under the First Amendment.  The Court held the statute 
invalid on its face, concluding that it swept within its prohibition too wide a 
swath of protected speech, including “the commercial production of plays, 
concerts, musicals, dance, or any other form of live entertainment,”67 without 
sufficient justification.  In an overbreadth case like Schad, the Court has 
explained, the claimant is permitted to raise a claim of facial invalidity largely 
because of a judicial concern that the challenged statute would otherwise 
“chill” the protected expression of parties other than the claimant.68 Thus, in 
 
63 I am unaware of any case in which the Supreme Court has held that a traditional 
disturbance of the peace statute is facially unconstitutional. 
64 Cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (invalidating disturbance of the peace 
statute as applied to defendant who appeared in county courthouse wearing a jacket bearing 
the words “Fuck the Draft”). 
65 452 U.S. 61 (1981). 
66 Id. at 63 & n.1. 
67 Id. at 66. 
68 See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972).  In the First Amendment 
area, the Court has stated that a statute must sweep in a “substantial” amount of protected 
Facial Challenges and the Commerce Clause  
 
15
effect, the overbreadth claimant vindicates the constitutional rights of third 
parties not before the Court.69 Because concerns about chilling effects and the 
rights of third parties are not limited to the First Amendment context, the 
Court has sometimes applied a species of overbreadth doctrine in other types 
of individual rights cases.  The “undue burden” test in the area of abortion 
rights, for example, has much in common with overbreadth analysis.70
The fact that a claimant may not have a valid as-applied challenge—for 
instance, at the time of Schad, it was unclear whether nude dancing was a form 
of protected expression within the ambit of the First Amendment71—is no 
barrier to raising an overbreadth challenge.  To the contrary, the Court has 
stated that claimants to whom a valid as-applied challenge is available are not 
permitted to bring a First Amendment overbreadth challenge.  In the 1985 
case of Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., the Court held that a facial challenge 
alleging First Amendment overbreadth could not be brought by a claimant 
who alleged that his own expressive conduct was constitutionally protected.72 
In other words, as-applied challenges and facial challenges of the First 
 
speech in order for an overbreadth facial challenge to succeed.  Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 
U.S. 601, 615 (1973). 
69 See, e.g., Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass’n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 392-93 (1988); 
Sec’y of State v. J.H. Munson, 467 U.S. 947, 956 (1984).  It is important to note that the 
claimant must still possess Article III standing to challenge the statute in federal court.  
Although the Court continues to view overbreadth as an exception to the usual limitations on 
third-party standing, it has made clear that those limitations are prudential and do not flow 
from Article III.  See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 15 n.7 (2004). 
70 See, e.g., John F. Decker, Overbreadth Outside the First Amendment, 34 N.M. L. REV. 53 
(2004); Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 264-
71 (1994) [hereinafter Dorf, Facial Challenges] (showing that, in cases concerning “fundamental 
rights” under the Due Process Clause, the Court has often applied something that looks very 
much like overbreadth review, asking whether the challenged statute on its face unduly 
burdens or chills protected conduct).   
The Court itself has stated that there are other doctrinal areas besides the First 
Amendment in which it has “recognized the validity of facial attacks alleging overbreadth 
(though not necessarily using that term).”  Sabri, 541 U.S. at 609-10, citing Aptheker v. 
Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (right to travel); Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 938-946 (abortion 
rights); Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532-35 (Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). But see Ayotte,
126 S. Ct. 961 (suggesting a return on the part of the Court to a preference for as-applied 
review even in the abortion area). 
71 See Schad, 452 U.S. at 66 (“[A]s the state courts in this case recognized, nude 
dancing is not without its First Amendment protections from official regulation.”) (citations 
omitted); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991) (holding that nude dancing “is 
expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment, though we view it as 
only marginally so”). 
72 472 U.S. 491, 503 (1985). 
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Amendment overbreadth variety are mutually exclusive.  This holding appears 
to be limited to First Amendment overbreadth, as opposed to overbreadth 
generally.  It is also subject to criticism on the grounds that it extends greater 
judicial solicitude to those engaged in constitutionally unprotected conduct 
than to those whose conduct is protected.73 
With the as-applied and overbreadth challenges behind us (and the 
valid-rule facial challenge still ahead of us), we can ask the question that has 
preoccupied courts and scholars for many years, particularly in the individual 
rights context: In what circumstances should a statute be struck down on its 
face?  The Court’s traditional answer has been: rarely.  The Court has 
explained that the act of striking down a statute on its face stands in tension 
with several traditional components of the federal judicial role, including a 
preference for resolving concrete disputes rather than abstract or speculative 
questions; a deference to legislative judgments; and a reluctance to resort to 
the “strong medicine” of constitutional invalidation unless absolutely 
necessary.74 Accordingly, the Court has consistently held, at least in the 
individual rights context, that facial invalidations should be the exception 
rather than the rule.75 
The Court laid down what appeared to be a general rule for the 
availability of facial challenges in United States v. Salerno, which involved a facial 
challenge to the Bail Reform Act under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment and the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment.  The 
Court emphasized that a claimant raising a facial challenge carries a “heavy 
burden.”76 “A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most 
difficult challenge to mount successfully,” observed Chief Justice Rehnquist 
for the Court, “since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances 
 
73 The claimant could also raise a nonconstitutional challenge, arguing that the court 
should adopt a narrow construction of the statute such that the claimant’s conduct is deemed 
unregulated simply as a matter of statutory construction.  Such an argument would be 
strengthened by a showing that the broader interpretation would violate the Constitution, or at 
least raise difficult constitutional questions.  Strategies of constitutional avoidance have a long 
pedigree and are commonly used by courts where statutory language permits (and sometimes 
even where it doesn’t). The practical result from the standpoint of the claimant is comparable 
to an as-applied invalidation, with the important difference being that the court does not bring 
the full power of judicial review to bear on the statute.  See generally Adrian Vermeule, Saving 
Constructions, 85 GEO. L. J. 1945 (1997); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 
341 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
74 See, e.g., Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 610-11 (“[C]ourts are not roving commissions 
assigned to pass judgment on the validity of the Nation’s laws.”). 
75 Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 580 (1998); Younger v. 
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 52-53 (1971). 
76 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).   
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exists under which the Act would be valid.”77 The Court in Salerno expressly 
exempted overbreadth challenges from its “no set of circumstances” 
requirement, but stated that overbreadth challenges were restricted to “the 
limited context of the First Amendment.”78 The Court in Salerno had little 
difficulty concluding that constitutionally valid applications of the Bail Reform 
Act existed, and thus rejected the defendants’ facial challenges.79
Lower courts in many cases have treated Salerno as setting forth an 
across-the-board threshold test for the availability of facial challenges, 
regardless of the constitutional clause being relied upon by the claimant, with 
the exception of First Amendment overbreadth claims and (in most circuits) 
abortion rights claims.80 But other courts, and several scholars, have criticized 
the Salerno test as a normative matter, or denied its broad applicability as a 
descriptive matter, or both.81 As Marc Isserles has described, critics of Salerno 
have argued that the “no set of circumstances” test consigns all facial 
challenges to inevitable failure, because courts can always envision some 




79 Id. at 746-55. 
80 See, e.g., Belitskus v. Pizzingrilli, 343 F.3d 632, 648 & n.10 (3d Cir. 2003); United 
States v. Robinson, 367 F.3d 278, 290 (5th Cir. 2004); Rosen v. Goetz, 410 F.3d 919, 933 (6th 
Cir. 2005); Home Builders Ass’n of Greater Chicago v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 335 F.3d 
607, 619-20 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1218, 1224 & n.2 (11th Cir. 
2005); cf. Rancho Viejo, 334 F.3d at 1160 (Roberts, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en 
banc) (“Given United States v. Salerno … a facial challenge can succeed only if there are no 
circumstances in which the Act at issue can be applied without violating the Commerce 
Clause”); Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Gonzales, No. 04-5201-CV, at *11-12 (2d Cir., Jan. 31, 2006) 
(Walker, C.J., concurring). 
Salerno, as mentioned, expressly excludes First Amendment overbreadth claims from 
the scope of its self-styled threshold test.  481 U.S. at 745.  As for the abortion rights context, 
most circuits currently apply the Casey “undue burden” test, as augmented by the Stenberg 
health exception requirement, rather than Salerno. See, e.g., Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. 
Hicks, 409 F.3d 619, 627-28 (2005) (collecting cases); Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791, 794-
95 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 2006 WL 385614 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2006) (No. 05-380) (discussing 
the tension between the Casey/Stenberg and Salerno standards); S.D. Myers, Inc. v. City and 
County of San Francisco, 253 F.3d 461, 467 (9th Cir. 2001) (“While we have held that Casey 
‘overruled Salerno in the context of facial challenges to abortion statutes,’ we will not reject 
Salerno in other contexts until a majority of the Supreme Court clearly directs us to do so.”) 
(citation omitted); Planned Parenthood of Rocky Mountains Servs. Corp. v. Owens, 287 F.3d 
910, 919 (10th Cir. 2002). 
81 See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 70; Alfred Hill, The Puzzling First Amendment Overbreadth 
Doctrine, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1063, 1072 n.34 (1997); John Christopher Ford, The Casey 
Standard for Evaluating Facial Attacks on Abortion Statutes, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1443, 1445 (1997). 
Facial Challenges and the Commerce Clause  
 
18
real incentive to launch a facial as well as an as-applied challenge; has little 
grounding in pre-Salerno case law and was arguably dicta in Salerno itself; and 
unduly privileges First Amendment overbreadth over other forms of facial 
challenge.82
On the Supreme Court itself, Justice Stevens has emerged as the 
primary champion of a narrow reading of Salerno in the individual rights 
context, and Justice Scalia as its primary defender.  For instance, in the 1999 
case of City of Chicago v. Morales, Justice Stevens (writing for a plurality of four 
justices) held a gang loitering ordinance facially unconstitutional on vagueness 
grounds under the Due Process Clause.83 Justice Scalia, in dissent, vigorously 
insisted that the plurality’s disposition ran afoul of Salerno’s requirement, since 
(according to Justice Scalia) it was possible to imagine a scenario in which the 
ordinance’s application to a particular group of loiterers would not be 
impermissibly vague.84 In response, Justice Stevens’s plurality opinion asserted 
that “[t]o the extent we have consistently articulated a clear standard for facial 
challenges, it is not the Salerno formulation, which has never been the decisive 
factor in any decision of this Court, including Salerno itself.”85 Justices Stevens 
and Scalia have also clashed over the facial vs. as-applied issue in separate 
statements concerning the denial of certiorari in abortion cases.86 The 2006 
Ayotte decision did not so much resolve this clash as institute a temporary 
truce: Justice O’Connor’s brief opinion for a unanimous Court never mentions 
Salerno and leaves it to the lower courts to fashion an appropriate remedy to 
address the risks posed by a parental notification statute that lacks an express 
 
82 Isserles, supra note 21, at 372-75. 
83 Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55, 64 (1999). 
84 Id. at 81-83 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (imagining a thinly disguised version of West Side 
Story unfolding on the South Side of Chicago). 
85 Id. at 55 n.22 (Stevens, J., opinion of the Court). 
86 Compare Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, 517 U.S. 1174, 1175 (1996) (Stevens, J., 
respecting the denial of certiorari) (“While a facial challenge may be more difficult to mount 
than an as-applied challenge, the dicta in Salerno ‘does not accurately characterize the standard 
for deciding facial challenges,’ and ‘neither accurately reflects the Court’s practice with respect 
to facial challenges, nor is it consistent with a wide array of legal principles.’”) with id. at 1178 
(Scalia, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (“It has become questionable whether, for 
some reason, this clear principle [i.e., Salerno’s “no set of circumstances” test] does not apply 
in abortion cases”).  See also, e.g., Ada v. Guam Soc. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 506 
U.S. 1011 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (explaining that the Ninth 
Circuit’s facial invalidation of a Guam law outlawing abortions except in cases of medical 
emergency “seems to me wrong, since there are apparently some applications of the statute 
that are perfectly constitutional”). 
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exception for cases of medical emergency.87 
Although Justices Stevens and Scalia have yet to resolve their debate 
over the circumstances in which facial challenges are properly entertained by 
courts, a proper understanding of that debate can be greatly enhanced by 
identifying a second type of facial challenge, distinct from the overbreadth 
challenge—namely, the valid-rule facial challenge.88 
B.  Valid-rule facial challenges. 
A valid-rule facial challenge asserts that a statute is invalid on its face as 
written and authoritatively construed, when measured against the applicable 
substantive constitutional doctrine, without reference to the facts or 
circumstances of particular applications.  The groundwork for the current 
understanding of valid-rule facial challenges was laid by Henry Monaghan in a 
celebrated 1981 article reinterpreting First Amendment overbreadth doctrine.89 
According to Monaghan, First Amendment overbreadth claims are not 
grounded in an exception to the usual prudential rules against third-party 
standing.90 Instead, Monaghan argues, overbreadth claims are best understood 
as instances of the general principle that every litigant must be permitted to 
vindicate his own right to be judged by a constitutionally valid rule of law: 
The operative rule, either as enacted or construed, must 
conform to the Constitution.  Thus, in addition to a claim of 
privilege, a litigant has always been permitted to make another, 
equally “conventional” challenge: He can insist that his 
conduct be judged in accordance with a rule that is 
constitutionally valid.  In sharp contrast to a fact-dependent 
privilege claim, a challenge to the content of the rule applied is 
independent of the specific facts of the litigant’s predicament.  
Rather, it speaks to the relationship between the facial content 
of the rule being applied to the facts and the applicable 
constitutional law, and it insists that that rule itself be valid.91 
On Monaghan’s view, First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, properly 
understood, flows not from some special exception to the procedural threshold 
requirements of standing but from the substantive requirements of the First 
Amendment itself, particularly the requirements of legislative precision and 
 
87 Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 126 S. Ct. 961 (2006). 
88 I have borrowed the term “valid rule facial challenge” (with an additional hyphen) 
from Marc Isserles.  See Isserles, supra note 21. 
89 Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 1. 
90 Id. at 13. 
91 Id. at 8. 




Monaghan’s specific reinterpretation of First Amendment overbreadth 
doctrine, it should be noted, has not been embraced by the Supreme Court, 
which generally continues to view overbreadth as an exception to the bar on 
third-party standing.93 But his insight that litigants have a personal right to be 
judged according to a valid rule of law can be viewed as underlying several 
holdings of the Supreme Court,94 and has won broad acceptance among 
scholars.95 
Marc Isserles builds upon Monaghan’s basic insight by reconciling 
Salerno with the broad availability of facial challenges in some areas of 
constitutional law outside the First Amendment.96 As Isserles demonstrates, 
critics of Salerno make the common error of assuming that all facial challenges 
are of the overbreadth variety.97 Isserles, by contrast, draws a sharp distinction 
between overbreadth challenges and what he calls “valid rule facial 
challenges.”  Unlike Monaghan, Isserles accepts at face value the Court’s 
repeated statements that overbreadth facial challenges are usually barred by 
rules prohibiting third-party standing, i.e., rules forbidding one person to raise 
the constitutional claims of another.98 Where overbreadth facial challenges are 
permitted—typically, though not exclusively, in cases involving First 
Amendment rights—it is because the Court is willing to grant a narrow 
 
92 Id. at 24-25, 37-39. 
93 See, e.g., Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612 (“[T]he Court has altered its traditional rules of 
standing to permit—in the First Amendment area—attacks on overly broad statutes with no 
requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be 
regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity.”) (citation omitted); but see 
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 768 n.21 (1982) (citing Monaghan for the proposition that 
“[a] person whose activity may be constitutionally regulated nevertheless may argue that the 
statute under which he is convicted or regulated is invalid on its face”). 
94 See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381-82 n.3 (1992); see also generally 
Dorf, supra note 70 (arguing that the valid rule requirement explains much of existing Supreme 
Court constitutional law doctrine). 
95 See Dorf, supra note 70; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and 
Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321 (2000) [hereinafter Fallon, As-Applied]; Isserles, 
supra note 21; but see Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: the Moral Structure of American 
Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1, 160 (1998) [hereinafter Adler, Rights Against Rules]
(“Unlike Monaghan, I think it is a grave mistake to conceptualize this judicial task as resting 
upon the proposition that, in his words: ‘[A] litigant has always had the right to be judged in 
accordance with a constitutionally valid rule of law.’”). 
96 See Isserles, supra note 21. 
97 Id. at 366. 
98 Id. at 366, 370. 
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exception to the usual prohibition on third-party standing, principally in order 
to prevent parties not before the court from being “chilled” in the exercise of 
protected rights for fear of prosecution.  The important point, for Isserles, is 
that a statute that is subject to invalidation for unconstitutional overbreadth 
still has—indeed, by definition must have—some constitutionally valid 
applications.  Thus, Salerno does not apply to overbreadth challenges, as the 
Court itself recognized in that case. 
The second type of facial challenge is the “valid rule facial challenge.”  
Following Monaghan, Isserles argues that in addition to arguing overbreadth, a 
claimant may assert her own personal right to be judged under a 
constitutionally valid rule of law.99 The valid-rule facial challenge differs from 
the overbreadth facial challenge in that it does not require any exception to the 
normal rules barring third-party standing, and it does not depend for its 
success on an examination of the constitutionality of any number of actual or 
potential statutory applications.100 On the contrary, because the constitutional 
infirmity inheres in the statute as it is written and authoritatively construed, 
that infirmity could be said to pervade all of the statute’s actual or potential 
applications.101 For the same reason, the question of statutory severability is 
not relevant in the context of a successful valid rule facial challenge, because 
there are no “valid applications” to remain behind after the invalid ones are 
severed.102 Thus, Isserles concludes,  
[a] valid rule facial challenge is a constitutional challenge that, if 
successful, satisfies Salerno’s “no set of circumstances” 
 
99 Id. at 387. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 407-08.  Statutory severance may still come into play, of course, if a 
particular provision of a larger statute is struck down facially as an invalid rule of law.  Though 
the provision as a whole would be invalidated, the remainder of the statute could stand, 
assuming the applicable test for severability is satisfied.     
In a similar vein, a statute might take the form of a rule plus an exception, as in 
Dorf’s example of a statute that criminalizes murder but exempts lynching.  Michael C. Dorf, 
The Heterogeneity of Rights, 6 LEGAL THEORY 269, 288-89 (2000) [hereinafter Dorf, Heterogeneity].  
If the grammatically separable exception for lynching is deemed invalid, it is probably wisest 
for a court to hold only that the exception is invalid, rather than the entire statute.  Of course, 
a federal court will often refrain from making such severance decisions if the statute under 
review is a state statute that has not been authoritatively construed; the choice of whether to 
strike some or all of the statute should be left to the state.  See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 
U.S. 535, 542-43 (1942).  In addition, Due Process concerns could prevent partial invalidation 
if the challenger could have reasonably relied on the pre-invalidation version of the statute 
without fair notice of its unconstitutionality.  See Fallon, As-Applied, supra note 95, at 1345 
n.124. 
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language.  That language, however, does not set forth an 
application-specific method of proof or a facial challenge 
“test,” but is rather a descriptive claim about a statute that on 
its face expresses an invalid rule of law.103 
A successful valid-rule facial challenge is not always available to 
claimants.  But, as Isserles explains, its availability is not a function of Salerno’s 
“no set of circumstances” formulation (which merely describes a successful valid 
rule facial challenge).  “Rather, a court’s choice between facial and as-applied 
invalidation is constrained by the structural relationship between the kind of 
constitutional challenge asserted, the way in which the statute is written and 
authoritatively construed, and the substantive constitutional doctrine on which 
the challenge is based.”104 Salerno is thus not a universally applicable threshold 
requirement for the availability of a facial challenge, but instead is best viewed 
as a rather clumsy articulation of the state of affairs that obtains when a valid-
rule facial challenge succeeds: there are no valid “applications,” because the 
rule itself is constitutionally deficient.105 
The case of R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul106 provides convenient 
illustrations of both types of facial challenge.  The case involved a First 
Amendment challenge to a city ordinance that made it a misdemeanor to 
display a symbol or other object “which one knows or has reasonable grounds 
to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, 
color, creed, religion or gender.”107 The Minnesota Supreme Court had given 
the ordinance a limiting construction, holding that it applied only to “fighting 
words,” i.e., expressions which themselves inflict harm or incite imminent 
violence and are not protected by the First Amendment.108 The constitutional 
claimant was a juvenile whose conduct—burning a cross on the lawn of a 
black family—plainly could have been proscribed by any number of valid 
 
103 Isserles, supra note 21, at 387. 
104 Id. at 423. 
105 To be sure, it would not be linguistically incoherent to maintain that Salerno states 
a threshold requirement even for valid-rule facial challenges, in the sense that an intrinsically 
defective statute by definition cannot have any valid applications.  Such an attempt to 
resuscitate Salerno as an across-the-board prerequisite for facial review, however, would be 
both needlessly circuitous and potentially misleading, because the court’s inquiry in a valid-rule 
facial challenge has nothing to do with the circumstances of particular applications, and 
because fanciful potential “valid applications,” even of an invalid rule, are often easy enough 
to concoct. 
106 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
107 Id. at 380 (quoting St. Paul, Minn., Legis. Code § 292.02 (1990)). 
108 Id. at 380-81. 
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statutes.109 Writing the opinion of the Court for five justices, however, Justice 
Scalia held the challenged ordinance facially unconstitutional because it 
discriminated among acts of symbolic speech on the basis of their content.110 
Even though the claimant’s own conduct was constitutionally unprotected, the 
content discrimination on the face of the ordinance rendered it an invalid rule 
for all purposes, because such discrimination “raises the specter that the 
Government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the 
marketplace.”111 Justice White, writing for four justices, agreed that the 
ordinance was facially invalid, but reached this conclusion on overbreadth 
grounds, reasoning that the statute (even as narrowed by the Minnesota 
Supreme Court) swept in an unacceptable amount of constitutionally protected 
speech.112 Both opinions resulted in facial invalidation—and in both, the fact 
that the claimant’s conduct was constitutionally regulable made no 
difference—but Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court treated the case as a 
valid-rule facial challenge, while Justice White’s opinion treated it as an 
overbreadth facial challenge.113 
C.  Determining when facial review is appropriate: specification, 
severability, and substantive constitutional doctrine. 
Scholars agree that facial adjudication occurs more frequently than the 
Supreme Court’s stingy, and ostensibly broadly applicable, test in Salerno would 
indicate.  Michael Dorf, in particular, has demonstrated that facial challenges 
turn out to be far more common that the Supreme Court has thus far seen fit 
to admit; in short, the “exception to the rule” is not especially exceptional after 
all.114 Most importantly from the point of view of this article, facial challenges 
 
109 Id. at 380 & n.1. 
110 Id. at 381-95. 
111 Id. at 387 (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime 
Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991)). 
112 Id. at 411-14 (White, J., concurring). 
113 R.A.V. also provides some support for another of this article’s claims: that the 
claimant’s own framing of his case is not dispositive of the availability of a valid-rule facial 
challenge.  As Justice White pointed out, id. at 398 n.1 (White, J., concurring), the claimant in 
R.A.V. framed his challenge almost exclusively in overbreadth terms, yet this did not prevent 
a majority of the Court from addressing the case as a valid-rule facial challenge. 
114 Dorf, Facial Challenges, supra note 70.  Richard Fallon, in an influential article, 
disagrees to some extent.  Fallon concludes that facial challenges ought to be relatively rare, 
and that for reasons of institutional prudence courts should err on the side of using the 
traditional as-applied model.  See Fallon, As-Applied, supra note 95, at 1352.  Only where 
“constitutional values are unusually vulnerable,” especially when individual liberties are subject 
to a potential chilling effect, should courts readily adopt “tests that invite rulings of facial 
invalidity and preclude the case-by-case curing of statutory defects.”  Id. 
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often succeed where a court concludes that a statute is motivated by an 
impermissible legislative purpose.115 Doctrinal tests that turn at least in part on 
an examination of legislative purpose—and that result in valid-rule facial 
review—are often used under the Equal Protection, Free Speech, dormant 
Commerce, and Establishment Clauses.116 In addition, as Isserles points out, 
facial review may be appropriate in cases applying “suspect classification” tests 
under the Equal Protection and Free Speech Clauses,117 and “void for 
vagueness” tests under the Free Speech and Due Process Clauses.  In all of 
these doctrinal areas, the Court has adopted substantive tests of constitutional 
validity which focus attention on the terms of the statute itself, or its purpose, 
history or structure, rather than on particular applications—in short, the Court 
has engaged in valid-rule facial review. 
Some constitutional doctrines are not as readily conducive to facial 
review, but do not necessarily lend themselves to traditional as-applied 
treatment either.  Such hybrid doctrines include those which call for some 
degree of regulatory “fit,” either via a “narrow tailoring” or “least restrictive 
alternative” test, a “congruence and proportionality” test, or a general 
balancing of the state’s regulatory interests with the importance of the 
individual freedom at stake.118 On the one hand, such doctrines often require 
a court to make an empirical or predictive judgment about how the challenged 
statute has been or will be applied, and the likely effects of such application—
the kind of judgment that is well suited to as-applied adjudication.  On the 
other hand, such doctrines typically ask the court to assess the “fit” between 
regulatory means and ends at the level of the statute itself, regardless of the 
validity of particular applications.  Thus, as Isserles points out, “even though 
[the narrow tailoring] inquiry necessarily involves an empirical judgment about 
the world, means/end scrutiny is a generalized inquiry that does not involve an 
assessment of particular, fact-dependent features of specific statutory 
applications.”119 
115 Id. at 264-271. 
116 Isserles, supra note 21, at 440. 
117 Id. at 442-43.  Fallon also includes a category he labels “forbidden content” tests, 
used in those rare areas in which the Court has held that enactment of a particular form of 
statute is entirely off-limits to the legislature.  Fallon, As-Applied, supra note 95, at 67, 83-84.  
An example might include a statute establishing a tax or fee as a prerequisite to voting.  See 
Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
118 Isserles, supra note 21, at 446-48. 
119 Id. at 446. 
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Perhaps the fullest analysis of the circumstances in which facial 
challenges ought to be entertained has been provided by Richard Fallon.120 On 
Fallon’s view, the key considerations in determining the appropriateness of 
facial adjudication are what he calls “specification” and “separability.”121 
Fallon argues that substantive doctrinal tests should be viewed as calling for 
facial review only when those tests “require that a statute be relatively fully 
specified at the time of its first application and, relatedly, call for a ‘facial’ 
determination of constitutional validity.”122 When a statute is deemed invalid 
under such a test, “its otherwise valid subrules will be deemed inseparable 
from valid ones and therefore unenforceable.”123 
Fallon’s criterion of specification is useful and sensible: it would be 
imprudent for a court to strike down a statute in all its applications if the court 
were unsure what those applications might turn out to look like.  But it is his 
concept of separability that has attracted the most attention; other scholars, 
both before and after Fallon, have placed great emphasis on this concept in 
seeking to explain when facial review is appropriate.124 For example, Michael 
Dorf seeks to explain the Salerno “no set of circumstances” rule by arguing that 
it sets forth an implicit “presumption of severability.”125 When a court applies 
this presumption, Dorf reasons, it in effect tells the claimant, “This statute is 
constitutionally valid as applied to you.  As for its allegedly unconstitutional 
applications to other people, we will wait for those cases to arise.  And we’ll 
assume now that if we do get around to striking down other applications of 
this statute, those applications will prove to be severable, leaving the valid 
remainder of the statute (including the part that we apply to you today) 
intact.”126 Similarly, Gillian Metzger places the notion of a presumption of 
 
120 Fallon, As-Applied, supra note 95. 
121 Id. at 1325 & n.31 (adapting the terms “specify” and “specification” from Henry 
S. Richardson, Specifying Norms As a Way to Resolve Concrete Ethical Problems, 19 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 279 (1990)). 
122 Fallon, As-Applied, supra note 95, at 1342. 
123 Id. 
124 Most other scholars, such as Dorf and Metzger, use the more common term 
“severability” rather than Fallon’s term “separability.”  Nothing appears to turn on this 
semantic distinction. 
125 Dorf also views this presumption as implicit in the much earlier case of Yazoo & 
Mississippi R.R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217 (1912), in which the Court rejected a 
Due Process and Equal Protection challenge to a statute requiring railroads to promptly settle 
claims for lost or damaged goods, holding that the statute was constitutional as applied to the 
facts of the case at bar.  Indeed, Dorf sometimes refers to the “Yazoo/Salerno presumption of 
severability.”  See, e.g., Dorf, Facial Challenges, supra note 70, at 251. 
126 Id. at 249. 
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severability at the center of her argument that facial challenges should not be 
the norm in cases arising under Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment 
enforcement power.127 
Yet the centrality of severability analysis to the question of facial vs. as-
applied review has been overstated by these commentators, primarily because 
they have approached the question from the standpoint of overbreadth as the 
exclusive model for facial challenges.  Contrary to the existing literature, not all 
successful facial challenges entail overcoming a presumption of severability, 
for two related reasons.  First, these commentators’ emphasis on severability 
gives short shrift to the possibility of facial validation. Typically, when a court 
rebuffs a constitutional challenge, it leaves open the possibility of later as-
applied challenges, as Dorf rightly points out.  But, at least in certain doctrinal 
contexts, courts can go further, not only rejecting the claimant’s facial 
challenge but declaring or implying that constitutional claims of the kind raised 
by the claimant simply cannot be successfully pressed against the challenged 
statute.   
Perhaps the simplest example of a facial validation arises in the context 
of what Dorf himself, in a paper co-authored with Matthew Adler, has called a 
“constitutional existence condition.”128 All federal statutes must be enacted in 
accordance with the procedures set forth in Article I, Section 7 of the 
Constitution.  If a statute were challenged as lacking a constitutional existence 
condition, and the challenge failed on the merits, the Court’s ruling would 
result in a facial validation.  To taking the limiting case, imagine that a claimant 
alleges that a statute is unconstitutional because the version of the bill passed 
by Congress was printed in a different typeface from the one signed by the 
President.  A court that reached the merits of such a claim would no doubt 
hold that the difference in typeface was constitutionally irrelevant: the statute 
is valid on its face and no further as-applied challenges are necessary to assess 
its validity.129 (If this example strikes some readers as too absurd to 
contemplate, consider the possibility of facial validations resulting from 
challenges under structural provisions such as the Appointments Clause, the 
Origination Clause, the Article I, section 7 requirement of bicameralism and 
 
127 See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 20 at 876 (“[T]he debate regarding the availability of 
facial challenges, in particular facial overbreadth challenges, is really a debate about statutory 
severability—that is, whether unconstitutional text or applications of a statute should be 
presumed severable or nonseverable in a given context.”) (citation omitted). 
128 See Matthew D. Adler & Michael C. Dorf, Constitutional Existence Conditions and 
Judicial Review, 89 VA. L. REV. 1105 (2003). 
129 A court might well not reach the merits.  Cf. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892) 
(version of bill passed by both houses of Congress and presented to the President constitutes 
authoritative text, and courts will not look behind that text). 
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presentment, or the separation of powers more generally.)130 The constitutional 
existence condition example demonstrates that scholars such as Fallon, Dorf 
and Metzger overstate their case when they suggest that facial challenges are 
appropriate only where the court has good reason to insist that a statute be 
separable.  In the existence condition case, the question of separability (or 
severability) would not arise.131 
The second—and related—reason why the severability approach is not 
fully adequate to the task of describing challenges to congressional power is 
the ubiquity of valid-rule facial challenges.  The existence condition challenge 
hypothesized above is of course a valid-rule facial challenge.  Fallon, Dorf, and 
Metzger argue that a successful facial challenge always entails overcoming a 
presumption against severability because they view facial challenges from the 
standpoint of what Marc Isserles has called the “overbreadth assumption.”132 
If one’s paradigm of a facial challenge is the overbreadth facial challenge—i.e., 
the statute is valid as applied to the claimant but must be struck down because 
it is invalid in a substantial portion of its other actual or potential 
applications—then interpreting Salerno as setting forth a presumption of 
severability makes eminent sense.  Except in the domains where overbreadth 
doctrine applies, the story goes, the unprotected claimant will not get the 
benefit of constitutional protections accorded to other parties not before the 
Court; the statute’s application to those other parties can be invalidated, and 
presumably severed, in later litigation.  But in the context of a valid-rule facial 
challenge, it is difficult to make sense of a “presumption of severability”: either 
the statute is valid as a whole (as in the typeface example) or it is invalid as a 
whole.  In neither case does severability—or, indeed, the entire notion of 
individual “applications”—become relevant.133 
It should not come as a surprise that the facial vs. as-applied debate 
cannot be reduced to a question of severability.  Severability is, after all, a 
matter of statutory interpretation and remedial discretion, not a matter of 
constitutional law.  To take an elementary illustration, a court might declare a 
particular statutory subsection to be unconstitutional on its face—even under 
 
130 See Adler & Dorf, supra note 128, at 1148. 
131 Indeed, in a case challenging a constitutional existence condition, Fallon’s criterion 
that the statute be “fully specified” at the time of adjudication (i.e., its operative legal meaning 
fully determined) would also be irrelevant.  The existence condition case is unusual, however, 
because the meaning of the statute is irrelevant to the merits of the constitutional challenge; 
typically, specification is a relevant criterion. 
132 Isserles, supra note 21, at 375-82. 
133 To put it differently, severability can be relevant in identifying (and preserving) 
valid subrules of otherwise invalid rules, but is of little use in identifying invalid subrules of 
otherwise valid rules.  I am grateful to Michael Dorf for this formulation of the point. 
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the exacting Salerno test—and yet sever the facially unconstitutional subsection, 
allowing the remainder of the statute to stand intact.134 Conversely, a court 
could conceivably invalidate a statute only “as applied” to a particular set of 
circumstances, and yet conclude as a matter of statutory interpretation that the 
legislature would not have intended the statute to stand unless it covered those 
circumstances; the result would be, for all practical purposes, indistinguishable 
from a facial invalidation. 
What these examples illustrate is that the severability question and the 
facial vs. as-applied review question stand on distinct grounds.  Severability is a 
function of (a) statutory structure and coherence, i.e., the capacity of a statute 
to survive once one or more of its applications have been invalidated; (b) 
legislative intent, i.e., an inquiry into whether the legislature would have wished 
its handiwork to remain after some portion of it had been struck down; and (c) 
institutional competency, i.e., the limits on the ability or readiness of a federal 
court to reformulate a partially invalidated federal statute, or to attempt to 
discern how the highest court of a state would treat or construe a partially 
invalidated state statute.135 The proper mode of constitutional review, by 
contrast, is a function of the applicable substantive constitutional doctrine, as 
manifested in the breadth or narrowness of a court’s holding. 
The same considerations reveal why the choice between facial and as-
applied review will not inevitably turn on the claimant’s framing of her own 
challenge.  Because the proper mode of review is a function of the applicable 
substantive doctrine, the parties will not always be in a position to determine 
whether the court engages in as-applied or facial review.  In particular, if 
substantive doctrine points the court towards valid-rule facial review, it seems 
unlikely that the claimant would be able to prevent the adjudication from 
focusing on the language, history, and structure of the statute in comparison to 
applicable constitutional requirements, rather than on facts about the 
claimant’s own activities.136 Conversely, if as-applied review is called for by the 
nature of the applicable substantive doctrine, the claimant cannot require the 
 
134 See, e.g., I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (striking down legislative veto 
provision on its face but severing it from remainder of statute); United States v. Booker, 543 
U.S. 220 (2005) (facially invalidating, but severing, provision making the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines mandatory in federal criminal cases). 
135 See generally Booker, 543 U.S. at 756-771 (opinion of Breyer, J., for the Court). 
136 Nor is it obvious, from a strategic point of view, why a claimant would wish to 
restrict herself to an as-applied challenge under such circumstances, with limited exceptions.  
A case like Raich is such an exception, because a facial Commerce Clause attack on the 
Controlled Substances Act was doomed to failure, and because it was not yet clear that the 
Court disfavored as-applied challenges in the Commerce Clause context. 
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court to entertain a facial challenge, as the Supreme Court has pointed out on 
numerous occasions.137 
The foregoing discussion conveys a broader lesson, namely, that there 
is no rigid analytic dichotomy between as-applied and facial challenges.  
Metzger rightly points out that “[t]he distinction between facial and as-applied 
challenges is more illusory than the ready familiarity of the terms suggests.”138 
Fallon concurs that “familiar and recurring kinds of tests illustrate how as-
applied adjudication can inevitably result in facial invalidations.”139 As he 
observes, “there is no single distinctive category of facial, as opposed to as-
applied, litigation.  Rather, all challenges to statutes arise when a particular 
litigant claims that a statute cannot be enforced against her.”140 Because of the 
effect of stare decisis and the nature of legal reasoning, an “as-applied” 
invalidation by the United States Supreme Court will usually have effects that 
go far beyond the particular claimant at bar to encompass all those similarly 
situated to the claimant in relevant respects.  Conversely, a “facial” challenge 
may attack a particular statutory title, subsection, or even a statutory phrase, on 
the grounds that the challenged enactment is unconstitutional as written or 
authoritatively construed.  Indeed, what makes a facial challenge distinctive is 
not that it challenges an entire statute, but that it challenges the targeted 
enactment, however broadly or narrowly defined, as it is written and authoritatively 
construed. As a leading treatise once observed, a facial challenge “puts into issue 
an explicit rule of law, as formulated by the legislature or the court, and 
involves the facts only insofar as it is necessary to establish that the rule served 
as a basis for decision.”141 Not only are facial and as-applied challenges less 
antipodal than is often assumed, but it can be argued that the overbreadth 
facial challenge serves as a kind of bridge between the traditional as-applied 
challenge and the valid-rule facial challenge: it shares with the former an 
 
137 See Yazoo & Mississippi R.R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217 (1912); United 
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987); Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004). 
138 Metzger, supra note 20, at 880.  See also Fallon, As-Applied, supra note 95, at 1341 
(arguing that “facial challenges are less categorically distinct from as-applied challenges than is 
often thought”); Dorf, Facial Challenges, supra note 70, at 294 (arguing that “[t]he distinction 
between as-applied and facial challenges may confuse more than it illuminates,” and that “[i]n 
some sense, any constitutional challenge to a statute is both as-applied and facial”); see generally 
Alfred Hill, Some Realism About Facial Invalidation of Statutes, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 647 (2001). 
139 Fallon, As-Applied, supra note 95, at 1338. 
140 Id. at 1324. 
141 PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 662 (3d ed. 1988).  Regrettably, subsequent editions of Hart and 
Wechsler’s treatise have replaced this definition of facial challenge with one based on the 
misleading language of the Salerno case. 
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emphasis on the facts of particular applications, and with the latter the 
practical effect of an all-or-nothing disposition.  In most instances, then, 
whether a judicial opinion is treated as an example of “facial” or “as-applied” 
review is likely to be a function of the breadth of the court’s holding, as 
dictated by the applicable substantive constitutional doctrine—not a function 
of severability analysis nor of the claimant’s pleading strategy. 
III.  RATIONALES FOR A FACIAL CHALLENGE APPROACH TO THE 
COMMERCE CLAUSE 
Although a great deal of scholarship has been devoted to ascertaining 
when facial challenges are appropriate in the context of individual rights, far 
less scholarly attention has been paid to that distinction in the context of the 
scope of congressional power.  The prominent exception is Gillian Metzger,142 
whose insightful analysis largely emphasizes cases arising under Section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment143 and pays comparatively little attention to 
Commerce Clause cases.144 Moreover, insofar as she addresses such cases, 
Metzger (like Fallon and Dorf) focuses largely on whether the Court’s 
Commerce Clause doctrine calls for a departure from the usual “presumption 
of severability.”145 Metzger does not explore the possibility of a valid-rule 
facial approach to Commerce Clause litigation. 
This Part explores several possible rationales on which such an 
approach might be grounded.  First, however, it will be useful to survey the 
Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause precedents to determine how the Court 
has historically approached such cases.  As we shall see, the Court’s Commerce 
Clause cases, prior to Lopez, do not form a consistent pattern of either facial or 
 
142 David Driesen has noted that the Court appears to favor facial challenges in the 
Commerce Clause area, a trend that he applauds because in his view it departs from the 
customary federal-court insistence on concreteness in adjudication and limits judicial 
interference with the political process. See David M. Driesen, Standing for Nothing: The Paradox of 
Demanding Concrete Context for Formalist Adjudication, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 808, 884 (2004).  See 
also Stewart, supra note 54. 
143 Indeed, Metzger’s analysis favoring as-applied review in Section 5 cases appears to 
have been implicitly adopted by the Court in United States v. Georgia, 126 S. Ct. 877 (2006). 
On as-applied challenges and Section 5, see also Kevin S. Schwartz, Note, Applying Section 5: 
Tennessee v. Lane and Judicial Conditions On The Congressional Enforcement Power, 114 YALE L. J. 
1143 (2005). 
144 See Metzger, supra note 20 at 905-13, 929-31 (discussing Commerce Clause cases 
and concluding that, with the possible exception of Lopez and Morrison, they do not depart 
from the ordinary presumption of severability). 
145 See, e.g., id. at 929 (“Perhaps most importantly, nothing in the class-of-activities 
analysis under the Commerce Clause mandates a nonseverability presumption and 
corresponding use of Salerno-style facial challenges.”). 
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as-applied review.  Since Lopez, the Court—or at least a controlling bloc of 
justices on the Court—has taken a facial approach to the Commerce Clause. 
A.  Precedent 
The 1869 case of United States v. DeWitt,146 which has been cited as the 
first Supreme Court decision to strike down a federal enactment as exceeding 
the Interstate Commerce power,147 is representative of the Court’s early 
decisions on the subject.  It is not entirely clear whether the Court in DeWitt 
proceeded on a facial or as-applied basis.  On the one hand, the Court 
answered a certified question from a lower federal court by flatly declaring 
unconstitutional Section 29 of the Internal Revenue Act, which made it a 
misdemeanor to make or sell, anywhere in the United States, dangerously 
combustible illuminating oils, such as those mixed with naphtha.148 On the 
other hand, the Court suggested that its decision invalidated the statute only 
insofar as the statute attempted to illegalize purely intrastate activity: “As a 
police regulation, relating exclusively to the internal trade of the State, it can 
only have effect where the legislative authority of Congress excludes, 
territorially, all State legislation, as for example, in the District of Columbia.  
Within State limits, it can have no constitutional operation.”149 
Some early cases take a more clearly facial approach, coupling facial 
invalidation with an express refusal to sever unconstitutional applications.  The 
Trade-Mark Cases150 provide an example.  At issue were the trademark acts of 
1870 and 1876, which provided for the registration of trademarks and for civil 
and criminal penalties against trademark counterfeiters and infringers.  The 
Court first noted that the statutes lacked a jurisdictional element,151 and then 
proceeded to note that the “indictments in these cases do not show that the 
trade-marks which are wrongfully used were trade-marks used in [interstate] 
commerce.”152 Finally, the Court refused to limit its holding to an as-applied 
invalidation: 
[W]hile it may be true that when one part of a statute is valid 
and constitutional, and another part is unconstitutional and 
 
146 76 U.S. 41 (1869). 
147 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 597 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing DeWitt as “the first time a 
Court struck down a federal law as exceeding the power conveyed by the Commerce Clause”). 
148 DeWitt, 76 U.S. at 43. 
149 Id. at 45. 
150 100 U.S. 82 (1879). 
151 Id. at 97 (“Here is no requirement that such person shall be engaged in the kind of 
commerce which Congress is authorized to regulate.”). 
152 Id. at 98. 
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void, the court may enforce the valid part where they are 
distinctly separable so that each can stand alone, it is not within 
the judicial province to give to the words used by Congress a 
narrower meaning than they are manifestly intended to bear in 
order that crimes may be punished which are not described in 
language that brings them within the constitutional power of 
that body.153 
Similarly, in the 1908 Employers’ Liability Cases,154 the Court facially 
invalidated the original version of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 
holding that by establishing a workers’ compensation scheme for all common 
carriers engaged in interstate commerce, the statute “of necessity includes 
subjects wholly outside of the power of Congress to regulate commerce.”155 
As in the Trade-Mark Cases, the Court refused to sever invalid applications 
from valid ones.156 The Court’s broad approach in the Trade-Mark Cases and 
the Employers’ Liability Cases—like its identical approach in an earlier case 
involving Congress’s Fifteenth Amendment enforcement power, upon which 
the Court relied heavily in these later cases157—has been criticized by 
subsequent courts and commentators.158 Other decisions, notably including 
those that upheld the validity of the federal lottery trafficking statute159 and the 
Mann (or White Slave) Act160 are probably best characterized as “facial 
validations”: since the statutes in question expressly regulated the transport of 
goods between states, they were impervious to Commerce Clause attack.161 
153 Id. 
154 207 U.S. 463 (1908). 
155 Id. at 498. 
156 See id. at 501. 
157 See United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1876). 
158 See, e.g., United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 23 (1960) (singling out the Trade-
Mark and Employers’ Liability Cases as among those “rarest of cases where this Court can 
justifiably think itself able confidently to discern that Congress would not have desired its 
legislation to stand at all unless it could validly stand in every application.”); DAVID P. CURRIE,
THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 1789-1888 
(1985) at 393-95, 430 (criticizing the narrow view of severability exemplified by Reese and the 
Trade-Mark Cases). 
159 Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903). 
160 Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 
470 (1917). 
161 See, e.g., Champion, 188 U.S. at 363; Hoke, 227 U.S. at 323. 
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In other early cases, however, the Court appeared to proceed on an as-
applied basis, although again the categorization of individual cases is not 
always free from doubt.  For example, in the 1881 case of Lord v. Goodall, 
Nelson & Perkins Steamship Co.,162 the Court upheld, as applied to a vessel 
employed exclusively in moving cargo on the Pacific Ocean between San 
Francisco and San Diego, a statute limiting a vessel owner’s liability for the 
loss of that vessel’s cargo.  Although this would appear to be a classic as-
applied validation, the Court injected an aspect of facial review into its decision 
by noting that the statute contained a jurisdictional element exempting vessels 
used in rivers or inland navigation, and concluding therefore that the statute 
“is relieved from the objection that proved fatal to the trade-mark law which 
was considered in Trade-Mark Cases. The commerce regulated is expressly 
confined to a kind over which Congress has been given control.”163 
Similarly, between 1899 and 1908, the Court in several cases upheld 
the constitutionality of the Sherman Antitrust Act as applied to the facts or 
allegations in the particular cases at bar.164 Likewise, several of the Court’s 
well-known pre-New Deal Commerce Clause cases, including Southern Railway 
v. United States,165 the Shreveport Rate Cases,166 and Stafford v. Wallace,167 appear to 
be best characterized as as-applied validations.168 
In the years immediately preceding the Court’s New Deal “switch in 
time,” the Court briefly returned to an aggressive posture of facial invalidation.  
Thus, in the 1935 case of Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad Co.,169 the 
Court struck down the Railroad Retirement Act as unconstitutional on its face, 
holding that “a pension plan thus imposed is in no proper sense a regulation of 
the activity of interstate transportation.  It is an attempt for social ends to 
impose by sheer fiat noncontractual incidents upon the relation of employer 
and employee, not as a rule or regulation of commerce and transportation 
between the states, but as a means of assuring a particular class of employees 
 
162 102 U.S. 541 (1881). 
163 Id. at 544-45. 
164 See Addyston Pipe & Steel v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); Northern Sec. v. 
United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905); Loewe 
v. Lawlor (The Danbury Hatters Case), 208 U.S. 274 (1908). 
165 222 U.S. 20 (1911). 
166 234 U.S. 342 (1914). 
167 258 U.S. 495 (1922). 
168 See also, e.g., Chicago Bd. of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1923). 
169 295 U.S. 330 (1935). 
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against old age dependency.”170 The “sick chicken case,” A.L.A. Schechter 
Poultry Corp. v. United States,171 seems to facially invalidate the live poultry codes 
promulgated under the National Industrial Recovery Act, and Carter v. Carter 
Coal Co.172 seems to do the same with respect to the Bituminous Coal 
Conservation Act.173 None of these cases uses the language of “facial” or “as-
applied” invalidation, however, and the analysis is made still more difficult by 
the presence in these cases of additional grounds of invalidity, such as the non-
delegation doctrine174 and the Due Process Clause.175 
As is well-known, from 1937 to 1995 the Court did not invalidate a 
single federal statute on Commerce Clause grounds.176 This simple fact makes 
it difficult to categorize the Court’s holdings as either facial or as-applied.  
Generally, the Court during this era was careful to frame its decisions, 
particularly those concerning federal regulation of intrastate activity, in the 
language of as-applied review.177 A prominent and oft-cited example, drawn 
 
170 Id. at 374.  The Court pointedly refused to sever invalid provisions or applications 
from valid ones, stating that “as to some of the features we hold unenforceable, it is 
‘unthinkable’ and ‘impossible’ that the Congress would have created the compulsory pension 
system without them. They so affect the dominant aim of the whole statute as to carry it down 
with them.”  Id. at 362. 
171 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
172 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
173 See id. at 315-16 (refusing to sever the price-fixing provisions of the statute from 
the labor provisions, but holding instead that they fall together); but see id. at 316-17 (“If there 
be in the act provisions, other than those we have considered, that may stand independently, 
the question of their validity is left for future determination when, if ever, that question shall 
be presented for consideration.”). 
174 See Schechter, 295 U.S. at 529-542. 
175 See R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 350 (1935); Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 
311-12. 
176 An arguable exception is Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), but 
this decision is best viewed as resting on implicit, or “Tenth Amendment,” limitations on 
federal power rather than on the Commerce Clause, see id. at 841 (appellants concede that 
challenged statute is “undoubtedly within the scope of the Commerce Clause”), and was in any 
case overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 529 (1985).  Similarly, 
the Court’s invalidation of a federal statute in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), 
rested on “Tenth Amendment” grounds rather than Commerce Clause grounds. 
177 See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 US 1, 30 (1937) (“[W]e are not at 
liberty to deny effect to specific provisions, which Congress has constitutional power to enact, 
by superimposing upon them inferences from general legislative declarations of an ambiguous 
character, even if found in the same statute.”); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 
U.S. 241, 261 (1964) (“We, therefore, conclude that the action of the Congress in the adoption 
of the Act as applied here to a motel which concededly serves interstate travelers is within the 
power granted it by the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.”); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 
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from outside the Commerce Clause context, is the 1960 case of United States v. 
Raines.178 In Raines, the government sought to enforce the Civil Rights Act of 
1957 to prevent officials of the State of Georgia from denying blacks the right 
to vote.  The officials argued—and the district court held—that because the 
statute by its terms prohibited “any person” from denying the right to vote on 
the basis of race, it was susceptible of unconstitutional application (i.e., 
application to private rather than state actors) and therefore should be deemed 
unconstitutional as a whole.179 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the 
statute was valid as applied to the state officers at bar, and declining to rule as 
to its potential application to private parties.180 Similarly, in its most recent 
(and extensive) discussion of the facial vs. as-applied distinction in the 
congressional power context (this time in the context of the Spending Clause), 
the Court has indicated that as-applied treatment is favored, and that facial 
challenges, particularly those of the overbreadth variety, “are especially to be 
discouraged.”181 
On the other hand, the Court continued to use broad and effectively 
facial reasoning in upholding direct federal regulation of the interstate 
transport of goods,182 and of commerce in goods that had traveled in interstate 
commerce in the past,183 and even of noncommercial activities involving goods 
 
US 294, 305 (1964) (“The Civil Rights Act of 1964, as here applied, we find to be plainly 
appropriate in the resolution of what the Congress found to be a national commercial problem 
of the first magnitude.”); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 146 (1971) (“The question in 
this case is whether Title II of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, as construed and applied 
to petitioner [a local loan shark], is a permissible exercise by Congress of its powers under the 
Commerce Clause of the Constitution.”) (citation omitted). 
178 362 U.S. 17 (1960). 
179 Id. at 20. 
180 Id. at 24-25; see also Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 104 (1971) (reaffirming 
appropriateness of as-applied review in cases testing the scope of Congress’s power to enforce 
Thirteenth Amendment and right to interstate travel); but see United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 
214 (1875) (striking down federal statute on its face as beyond the scope of Congress’s 
Fifteenth Amendment enforcement power when statute contained no state action limitation). 
181 Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609 (2004).  See also Salinas v. United States, 
522 U.S. 52 (1997). 
182 See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941) (“The power of 
Congress over interstate commerce ‘is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, 
and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed by the constitution.’” (quoting 
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 196 (1824)). 
183 See United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 696 (1948) (upholding labeling 
requirements of federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act even as applied to intrastate sale, and 
“without regard to … how many intrastate sales had intervened, or who had received the 
articles at the end of the interstate shipment”). 
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that had traveled in interstate commerce in the past.184 Most importantly for 
present purposes, the cumulative effect of the Court’s decisions upholding 
every challenged federal regulation of local activity affecting interstate commerce 
could be viewed as the functional equivalent of facial validation.  Incidentally, 
this cumulative effect illustrates the illusory quality of the supposed bright line 
that separates facial from as-applied review: If a federal commodity price 
control statute is constitutional as applied to a farmer who consumes his own 
home-grown wheat,185 and a federal consumer protection statute is 
constitutional as applied to a local loan shark,186 an observer could be forgiven 
for concluding that no activity, however local, will be held to fall outside the 
scope of the commerce power.  This impression of a de facto regime of facial 
validation was only reinforced by the Court’s frequent reminders that “[w]here 
the class of activities is regulated and that class is within the reach of federal 
power, the courts have no power ‘to excise, as trivial, individual instances’ of 
the class.”187 Once the Commerce Clause becomes a “Hey, you-can-do-
whatever-you-feel-like Clause,”188 the distinction between facial and as-applied 
challenges in the commerce power context is a purely academic matter. 
Then came Lopez and Morrison. As previous commentators have 
noted,189 it seems best to describe those decisions as facial invalidations.  In 
Lopez, the Court trains its focus almost exclusively on the terms of the Gun 
Free School Zones Act, noting that the statute “by its terms has nothing to do 
with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise”;190 “contains no 
jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that 
the firearm possession in question affects interstate commerce”;191 is not 
accompanied by legislative findings concerning the effects of the regulated 
activity on interstate commerce;192 and can be connected to interstate 
 
184 See Scarborough v. United States, 461 U.S. 563, 575 (1977) (interpreting a federal 
criminal statute to prohibit possession by convicted felons of a firearm that has traveled in or 
affected interstate commerce, and strongly suggesting that Congress may regulate intrastate, 
noncommercial activity involving goods that have crossed state lines). 
185 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
186 Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971). 
187 Id. (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 193 (1968)). 
188 Alex Kozinski, Introduction to Volume Nineteen, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 5 
(1995). 
189 Metzger, supra note 20 at 876; see generally Stewart, supra note 142. 
190 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560. 
191 Id. at 561. 
192 Id. at 562. 
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commerce only through an attenuated series of inferences.193 To be sure, at 
the end of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court there is a brief 
mention of the particular facts of the case at bar, but even then the point of 
the exercise seems to be to emphasize that the statute is far removed from any 
obvious matter of interstate commerce: “Respondent was a local student at a 
local school; there is no indication that he had recently moved in interstate 
commerce, and there is no requirement that his possession of the firearm have 
any concrete tie to interstate commerce.”194 
Morrison has a similarly facial cast.  The Court begins by describing its 
task as one of determining whether the civil remedy provision of the Violence 
Against Women Act “falls within Congress’ power under Article I, § 8, of the 
Constitution.”195 It then follows the methodology of Lopez, noting that 
“[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, 
economic activity”;196 that the statute “contains no jurisdictional element 
establishing that the federal cause of action is in pursuance of Congress’ power 
to regulate interstate commerce”;197 that Congress’s findings were inadequate 
to support the statute’s validity;198 and that the connection between the 
conduct regulated by the statute and interstate commerce is attenuated.199 
Although Lopez and Morrison do not expressly state that they are facial 
challenge cases, the Court has since characterized them as such.200 
This picture seems to be reversed in Raich, but only at first sight.  On 
the surface, Justice Stevens’ opinion for the Court appears to proceed along as-
applied lines.  Thus, for example, the Court takes pains to note that, in explicit 
contrast to Lopez and Morrison, “respondents ask us to excise individual 
applications of a concededly valid statutory scheme.”201 To be sure, the Court 
 
193 Id. at 564, 567. 
194 Id. at 567. 
195 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607. 
196 Id. at 613. 
197 Id. 
198 Id. at 614-15. 
199 Id. at 615-16. 
200 See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2209 (“[I]n both Lopez and Morrison, the parties asserted 
that a particular statute or provision fell outside Congress’ commerce power in its entirety.”).  
Another seemingly facial holding—though this time a validation rather than an invalidation—
is Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129 (2003) (upholding against Commerce Clause 
challenge a federal statute providing evidentiary and discovery privilege in state court for 
reports involving potential accident sites or hazardous roadway conditions compiled in order 
to receive federal highway funds). 
201 Raich, at 2209. 
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assesses the statute’s validity as applied to an entire subclass of regulated 
activities (i.e., “the intrastate, noncommercial cultivation and possession of 
cannabis for personal medical purposes as recommended by a patient’s 
physician pursuant to valid California state law”202) rather than as applied to 
the respondents’ activities alone, but the decision still purports to limit itself to 
an examination of Congress’s power to regulate that discrete subclass: 
The question, however, is whether Congress’ . . . decision to 
include this narrower ‘class of activities’ within the larger 
regulatory scheme, was constitutionally deficient.  We have no 
difficulty concluding that Congress acted rationally in 
determining that none of the characteristics making up the 
purported class, whether viewed individually or in the 
aggregate, compelled an exemption from the CSA; rather, the 
subdivided class of activities . . . was an essential part of the 
larger regulatory scheme.203 
As noted above, however, Raich is best understood as a facial validation, and as 
a strong signal of the Court’s rejection of an as-applied approach to 
Commerce Clause review.204 
A separate strain in the Court’s case law has involved the invocation of 
the doctrine of saving constructions.  As early as 1838, in United States v. 
Coombs, the Court noted that the technique of reading statutes narrowly to 
avoid constitutional questions was available in cases testing the scope of 
Congress’s power.205 In Coombs, however, this discussion seems to have been 
dicta.  The Court appeared to uphold the challenged statute on its face, 
concluding that the Necessary and Proper Clause gave Congress the requisite 
authority to provide criminal sanctions for plundering even those wrecked or 
distressed ships that had run aground above the high water mark and might 
therefore seem beyond the reach of the federal admiralty jurisdiction.206 The 
Court therefore pointedly declined to issue a narrowing construction, despite 
the arguable ambiguity of the statute.207 
By contrast, in the well-known 1895 case of United States v. E.C. 
Knight,208 the Court used the narrowing construction technique to affirm the 
 
202 Id. at 2201. 
203 Id. at 2211. 
204 See supra text accompanying notes 12-14. 
205 37 U.S. 72, 75-76 (1838). 
206 See id. at 74-75. 
207 See id. at 75, 80.   
208 156 U.S. 1 (1895). 
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dismissal of a suit by the United States for injunctive and equitable relief 
against five sugar companies for violating the Sherman Antitrust Act.  After 
holding that manufacturing precedes interstate commerce and is not a part of 
it, the Court proceeded to construe the Sherman Act not to apply to the 
activities of the sugar companies.209 Similarly, in a 1909 Commerce Clause case 
the Court held that “[w]here a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by 
one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the 
other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter.”210 
Though more common in earlier years, the saving construction method was 
used during the heyday of Commerce Clause deference in a case to hold that 
the jurisdictional element in a statute that made it a crime to “receive[], 
possess[], or transport[] in commerce or affecting commerce [...] any firearm” 
modified all the preceding elements211; and the method has been revived post-
Lopez, to hold that a private, owner-occupied home does not qualify as 
“property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting 
interstate or foreign commerce” within meaning of the federal arson statute,212 
and to hold that the Army Corps of Engineers’ definition of “navigable 
waters” under the Clean Water Act to include intrastate waters used as habitat 
by migratory birds exceeded the Corps’ statutory authority.213 
This review of precedent suggests that the Court has not historically 
followed a consistent pattern of either facial or as-applied adjudication in the 
Commerce Clause area.  The preference for facial challenges evinced by Lopez,
Morrison, and Raich appears to be a relatively new phenomenon.  The 
remainder of this Part explores several rationales that might explain that 
preference: a formalist conception that views rights as discrete zones of 
privileged conduct but envisions powers as extending to the limits of their 
internally defined scope; an understanding of the Commerce Clause that views 
Congress’s power under that clause as plenary, or at least judicially 
unconstrained; a conception of Commerce Clause challenges as overbreadth 
facial challenges; and an understanding of the Commerce Clause grounded in a 
 
209 Id. at 10.  Justice Harlan complained that the majority had offered a cramped 
reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause, id. at 39-40 (Harlan, J., dissenting), and observed 
that “[w]hile the opinion of the court in this case does not declare the act of 1890 to be 
unconstitutional, it defeats the main object for which it was passed.”  Id. at 42 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). 
210 United States ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 
(1909).  See also Texas v. E. Tex. R.R. Co., 258 U.S. 204, 217 (1922). 
211 United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 339 (1971). 
212 Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000). 
213 Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 
159 (2001). 
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requirement of appropriate legislative purpose.  I conclude that a controlling 
bloc of justices is motivated by an understanding of the Commerce Clause’s 
meaning that includes a requirement of appropriate legislative purpose, and 
that this provides the soundest explanation for the Court’s movement toward 
valid-rule facial review in Commerce Clause cases.   
B.  The formalist conception: rights as zones of privileged conduct. 
It could be argued that individual rights cases in general should be 
adjudicated on an as-applied basis, while cases testing the limits of federal 
power in general should be adjudicated on a facial basis, on the ground that 
rights-based cases entail judicial protection of zones of privileged conduct 
while powers cases do not.  I label this argument the formalist conception. The 
formalist conception holds that constitutional rights provisions, as construed by 
the Court over time, grant their holders the privilege to engage in particular 
activities (speaking, confronting witnesses against them in court, obtaining 
abortions without undue burdens, and so on), any law to the contrary 
notwithstanding.  On this view of “rights as trumps,”214 as-applied review is 
especially well-suited to claims involving rights, because the individual right to 
engage in particular forms of conduct authorizes a court to carve out 
subclasses of exemption from the otherwise concededly valid scope of a 
statutory prohibition.  (See Figure 1.) 
 
Thus, a statute generally prohibiting littering can be adjudged unconstitutional 
as applied to political leafletting because the claimant has a First Amendment 
right to engage in the privileged conduct of political leafletting (represented by 
 
214 The vision of rights as “trumps,” sufficient to override otherwise valid regulations, 
is most prominently expressed in RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 184-205 
(1977).  Dworkin has been described as a “sophisticated formalist.”  Brian Leiter, Positivism, 
Formalism, Realism, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1138, 1146 (1999). 
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one of the white ovals in Figure 1).215 But the statute continues to be a validly 
enforceable exercise of government power as applied to the broad range of 
nonexpressive littering (represented by the shaded area in Figure 1).216 
By contrast, on the formalist conception, constitutional powers 
provisions simply extend until they exhaust their own internally defined scope.  
Any limitations on the governmental authority conferred by a power-granting 
provision, therefore, are already present by negative implication in the 
provision’s own definition, rather than being carved out as oases of privileged 
conduct.  The court’s task is to adumbrate the boundary that separates 
authorized from unauthorized regulation, not to excise discrete zones of 
exempted conduct.  (See Figure 2.) 
 
215 Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); for discussion, see Village of Schaumburg 
v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980). 
216 Three additional features of Figure 1 are worth noting.  First, if the unshaded 
zones were to occupy an exceptionally large proportion of the shaded area, the statute might 
be struck down on its face on grounds of overbreadth, particularly if First Amendment 
expressive freedoms were at stake.  Second, some conduct that is unquestionably protected by 
the Constitution may lie outside of a challenged statute’s prohibitory ambit.  (This possibility is 
represented by the white oval that straddles the boundary of the shaded area.)  In cases that 
present this kind of intersection between a zone of protected conduct and the outer boundary 
of a statutory prohibition, courts will often invoke the classic version of the canon of 
constitutional avoidance and will construe the statute not to apply to the protected conduct.  
Third, zones of unquestionably protected conduct may well be surrounded by penumbras of 
arguably protected conduct.  (This possibility is represented by the medium-gray oval in the 
upper left of the diagram.)  In such cases, courts will often invoke the modern version of the 
canon of constitutional avoidance and will construe the statute to apply neither to the arguably 
nor to the unquestionably protected conduct.  On the distinction between the “classical” and 
“modern” constitutional avoidance canons, see Vermeule, Saving Constructions, supra note 73, at 
1949; Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, (forthcoming 2006, on 
file with author) at 13-17. 
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The formalist conception makes a convenient fit with the intellectual 
history of Commerce Clause precedent canvassed above in Part III.A.  During 
periods when the Court has adhered to a formalist vision of the Commerce 
Clause, such as the immediate pre-1937 era of Alton Railroad,217 Schechter 
Poultry,218 and Carter Coal,219 as well as the era inaugurated by Lopez,220 the Court 
has favored a facial approach to Commerce Clause adjudication.221 By 
contrast, during periods when the Court adhered to a functionalist vision of 
the Commerce Clause, such as the period from 1937 to 1995, the as-applied 
approach has generally predominated.222 The formalist conception perhaps 
gains additional credibility from the Court’s abandonment of the “dual 
federalism” model of federal and state power.223 The Court’s decision, in 
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,224 to repudiate its short-lived 
effort at defining unregulable spheres of traditional State governmental activity 
suggests that the model of federalism as marking out spheres of conduct 
immune from federal regulation is obsolete.225 Rather, the federal government, 
as Chief Justice Marshall put it in McCullough v. Maryland, “though limited in its 
powers, is supreme within its sphere of action.”226 
This formalist argument for presumptively facial review in cases 
challenging the scope of congressional power has considerable intuitive 
 
217 295 U.S. 330 (1935). 
218 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
219 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
220 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
221 See supra notes 169-175, 189-200. 
222 See supra notes 176-188. 
223 Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1852); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-4, at 808 n.6, and § 5-11, at 862-77 (3d ed. 2000); 
BORIS I. BITTKER, BITTKER ON THE REGULATION OF INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN 
COMMERCE §§ 4.03, 6.02[C], 6.03 (1999). See also EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE COMMERCE 
POWER AND STATES’ RIGHTS 115-172 (1936). 
224 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), overruling Nat’l 
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
225 Some recent statements from the Court, however, indicate that the vision of dual 
federalism may not be entirely dead.  See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568-83 (1995) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156-57 (1992) (O’Connor, J., opinion 
of the Court); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (Scalia, J., opinion of the Court) 
(invoking “historical understanding and practice[,] the structure of the Constitution, and … 
the jurisprudence of this Court” in striking down the Brady Act on anti-commandeering 
grounds). 
226 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406 (1819). 
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appeal—and, if accepted, would suggest the appropriateness of facial review in 
cases involving all heads of federal authority, including but not limited to the 
Commerce Clause.227 However, the argument ultimately proves unconvincing, 
for two reasons. 
First, as the discussion in Part II of valid-rule facial challenges 
demonstrates, the argument dramatically misdescribes the constitutional law of 
individual rights.  Individual rights are not invariably, or even usually, defined 
in terms of zones of privileged conduct.  Indeed, relatively few constitutional 
rights have been interpreted to create a sphere of conduct that is immune to 
government regulation.228 Rather, in most areas of constitutional law, from the 
First Amendment to the Equal Protection, Due Process, and Establishment 
Clauses, the Court has made clear that even successful litigants cannot protect 
their conduct behind a shield of constitutional impunity.  Conduct which 
cannot be validly regulated in a given instance by Statute A could be validly 
regulated by Statute B.  What matters in most cases is the nature of the 
regulation: Statute B may be appropriately precise where Statute A was 
unconstitutionally vague; Statute B may be evenhanded where Statute A was 
impermissibly underinclusive; Statute B may be neutral in its purpose where 
Statute A was motivated by illegitimate legislative animus, and so on.  This is 
why, as discussed in Part II, facial review in individual rights cases is far more 
common than is conventionally recognized.229 Indeed, some statutes, such as 
those motivated by an illegitimate purpose, are vulnerable to being struck 
down on their face under valid-rule facial review.  In such instances, at least, 
Matthew Adler is correct that constitutional rights under the American system 
of judicial review are “rights against rules.”230 
227 Cf. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 743 (2003) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“When a litigant claims that legislation has denied him individual rights secured by 
the Constitution, the court ordinarily asks first whether the legislation is constitutional as 
applied to him. When, on the other hand, a federal statute is challenged as going beyond 
Congress’s enumerated powers, under our precedents the court first asks whether the statute is 
unconstitutional on its face.”) (citations omitted). 
228 See Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, 
and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 729-30 (“Rights are not general trumps against 
appeals to the common good or anything else; instead, they are better understood as 
channelling the kinds of reasons government can invoke when it acts in certain arenas. 
Moreover, this is not an exceptional doctrine for aberrational contexts but a pervasive feature 
of many constitutional rights.”). 
229 See supra Part II.B. 
230 Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules, supra note 95.  Adler’s argument is rich and 
complex, and this article does not take a position on his larger claims, or those raised in 
opposition by Richard Fallon.  For their colloquy, see Fallon’s paper, As-Applied, supra note 95, 
to which Adler replied in the same issue of the Harvard Law Review: Matthew D. Adler, 
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This is not to say that zones of privileged activity do not play an 
important role in constitutional law.  Some rights, as Michael Dorf has put it, 
really are “rights simpliciter.”231 A particularly unambiguous example is the right 
not to be enslaved, enshrined in the Thirteenth Amendment.232 Any statute or 
other government action—or indeed any private action—that results in 
involuntary servitude is to that extent unconstitutional, and a court’s judgment 
so declaring is likely to take on an “as-applied” cast.233 Similarly, rights against 
executive enforcement action or fundamental unfairness in the judicial process 
are often best characterized as rights to a sphere of privileged conduct: the 
privilege against compelled self-incrimination, the right to be free of 
unreasonable searches and seizures, and the right not to be tortured are good 
examples.  Additionally, the Court has arguably carved out some rights 
simpliciter in the area of fundamental rights of private autonomy and free 
expression, areas which are accordingly characterized by an as-applied or an 
overbreadth mode of review.  When such rights are at stake, the reviewing 
court is typically called upon to identify a logical subclass of regulated activities 
and determine whether that subclass must be exempted from regulation, either 
via constitutional invalidation plus severance or via narrowed statutory 
construction. 234 
This explains why, in the famous case of United States v. Carolene Products 
Co., the Court upheld a federal regulatory statute against facial challenge but 
went on “recognize that the constitutionality of a statute, valid on its face, may 
be assailed by proof of facts tending to show that the statute as applied to a 
particular article is without support in reason… .”235 While this passage, read 
out of context, could be taken to assert that the Court was willing to entertain 
claims arguing that a particular application of a federal statute lies beyond the 
 
Rights, Rules, and the Structure of Constitutional Adjudication: A Response to Professor Fallon, 113 HARV.
L. REV. 1371 (2000).  
231 Dorf, Heterogeneity, supra note 102, at 270. 
232 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
233 Not inevitably, though—a statute that declared “All Republicans are hereby 
declared slaves of Democrats” would surely be judged invalid on its face, under both the 
Thirteenth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. 
234 Of course, even fundamental rights can be validly abridged when the government 
can demonstrate that such abridgment is a narrowly tailored means to achieve a compelling 
governmental interest.  Though an analysis of the proper mode of adjudication in fundamental 
rights cases lies beyond the scope of this article, it can be argued that the narrow tailoring 
prong of strict scrutiny calls for a kind of overbreadth review.  See, e.g., Isserles, supra note 21, 
at 416-17 (noting that the Court “has suggested that ‘overbreadth’ and ‘narrow tailoring’ are 
different expressions for precisely the same constitutional defect.”). 
235 304 U.S. 144, 153-54 (1938). 
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outer bounds of federal power, in fact it occurs during a part of the opinion 
dealing with the claimant’s Fifth Amendment Due Process argument.236 It is 
thus sounder to read this passage as leaving open the possibility that particular 
applications might be subject to an as-applied, Due Process–based challenge.  
By the same token, the Supreme Court in Raich remanded the case to the lower 
courts for adjudication of the medical marijuana users’ substantive due process 
claim, which would indeed be addressed on an as-applied basis. 237 
The notion of rights as shields for privileged conduct fails to provide a 
sound basis for differential treatment of rights claims and powers claims for a 
second, complementary reason.  Even if one accepts the vision described by 
Figure 2, and envisions federal power as extending until it exhausts its 
internally defined scope, it does not follow that as-applied review is 
inappropriate in the context of a challenge to the scope of federal power.  This 
can be seen by examining Figure 3, which superimposes onto Figure 2 a 
medium-gray oval representing the scope of activities prohibited by a federal 
regulatory statute as authoritatively construed. 
 
Even if the federal court’s principal task is to determine the boundary 
of permissible federal authority, there is no compelling reason in theory or 
practice why it could not perform this task through a series of as-applied 
adjudications.  The Court could invalidate statutes insofar as, but only insofar 
as, they purport to regulate activities that fall outside the scope of the relevant 
enumerated power. Thus, for example, a court in Case 1 could adjudicate the 
 
236 Id. 
237 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2215. 
Activities within the scope of 
federal regulatory authority 
Activities outside the scope of 
federal regulatory authority 
Fig. 3 
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federal statute represented in Figure 3 to be valid as applied to the activity 
represented by the letter x, but in Case 2 could adjudicate it to be invalid as 
applied to the activity represented by the letter y. This, after all, was the 
approach proposed by Justice O’Connor in her dissent in Raich. 238 
In short, the formalist conception of rights as shields for privileged 
conduct cannot serve as the rationale for an across-the-board distinction 
between the proper mode of judicial analysis in rights cases as opposed to 
powers cases.  Both rights claims and powers claims are, to borrow Dorf’s 
term, “heterogeneous”—they can and should be framed in either facial or as-
applied terms, depending on the interaction between the challenged statute 
and the underlying substantive constitutional doctrine.239 
C.  The commerce power as plenary or judicially unconstrained. 
The simplest way to justify a facial approach to Commerce Clause 
cases would be to posit that federal regulatory power in the age of the globally 
interconnected economy has effectively become plenary.  Or, more sensibly—
at least from the standpoint of a theory of judicial review that takes 
comparative institutional capacity seriously240—one could argue that limits on 
the commerce power ought not to be judicially enforceable.  This latter view 
was expressed by Herbert Wechsler in his celebrated (though often criticized) 
article on “The Political Safeguards of Federalism,” and other scholars who 
 
238 Cf. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2224 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“A number of objective 
markers are available to confine the scope of constitutional review here.  Both federal and 
state legislation . . . recognize that medical and nonmedical . . . uses of drugs are realistically 
distinct and can be segregated, and regulate them differently.  . . . Respondents challenge only 
the application of the CSA to medicinal use of marijuana.”). 
239 As a descriptive matter, one might add that the formalist conception’s sharp 
divide between rights-based claims and power-based claims stands in tension with the Court’s 
repeated insistence that the system of federalism is ultimately designed to enhance individual 
freedom.  See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616 n.7 (“the Framers crafted the federal system of 
Government so that the people’s rights would be secured by the division of power”); New 
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182 (1992) (“[T]he Constitution divides authority between 
federal and state governments for the protection of individuals”); Atascadero State Hospital v. 
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) (“The ‘constitutionally mandated balance of power’ between 
the States and the Federal Government was adopted by the Framers to ensure the protection 
of ‘our fundamental liberties’.”) (quoting Garcia, 469 U.S. at 572 (Powell, J., dissenting)).  The 
formalist conception is not flatly inconsistent with these statements, however.  Judicially 
enforced federalism could serve indirectly to enhance individual freedom without marking off 
discrete zones of protected conduct. 
240 See generally Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 
MICH. L. REV. 885 (2003) (arguing that legal interpretation should be guided by considerations 
of institutional capacity and institutional incentives). 
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have followed in Wechsler’s footsteps.241 On this view, the distinction 
between facial and as-applied review in Commerce Clause cases would vanish: 
no Commerce Clause claimant would prevail in court, no matter how his claim 
was characterized.  A court that forthrightly adopted such an approach would 
perhaps best be described as engaging in facial validation, as described earlier: 
not only does the particular claimant at bar have no valid constitutional claim, 
but neither does any other actual or potential claimant.242 Indeed, in its 
strongest form, this approach could render Commerce Clause arguments 
effectively nonjusticiable.243 
This was the approach that held sway on the Court between 1937 and 
1995, in terms of outcomes if not in terms of rationale.  And it is quite 
possible that this view, or something like it, continues to be held by the bloc of 
four justices who dissented in Lopez, Morrison, and several other recent 
federalism cases: Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.244 To be sure, 
these justices are sometimes willing to construe federal statutes narrowly in 
light of federalism concerns,245 or to sign on to opinions that use clear 
statement rules in an effort to focus the attention of the political branches on 
 
241 See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the 
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954); JESSE H. 
CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL 
CONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the 
Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000).  Cf. Garcia 
v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,  469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985) (adopting the political 
safeguards of federalism view, at least with regard to the question whether Congress may 
regulate the States in the exercise of traditional governmental functions: “Any rule of state 
immunity that looks to the ‘traditional,’ ‘integral,’ or ‘necessary’ nature of governmental 
functions inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which state 
policies it favors and which ones it dislikes”).  For critiques of the Wechsler approach, see 
Frank Cross, Realism About Federalism, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1304 (1999); John O. McGinnis and 
Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States’ Rights: A Defense Of Judicial Review In A Federal System, NW. U. L. 
REV. 89 (2004); Garcia, 469 U.S. at 565 n.9: “Professor Wechsler, whose seminal article in 1954 
proposed the view adopted by the Court today, predicated his argument on assumptions that 
simply do not accord with current reality.” (Powell, J., dissenting). 
242 See supra text accompanying notes 127-128.  
243 See Choper, supra note 241, at 175. 
244 See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 609 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The commerce power, we 
have often observed, is plenary.”); id. at 615-31 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Seminole Tribe of Fla. 
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 76-101 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting);  Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary 
Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 648-65 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
245 See, e.g., Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court in United States v. Jones, 529 
U.S. 848 (2000). 
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the traditional prerogatives of the States,246 but they appear unlikely to vote to 
strike down any plausibly rational federal statute on Commerce Clause 
grounds, either facially or as applied.   
These justices, however, do not command a majority on the current 
Court.  To the contrary, the five-justice majority in Lopez emphatically stated 
that the Constitution “withhold[s] from Congress a plenary police power that 
would authorize enactment of every type of legislation,”247 and refused to 
conclude “that the Constitution’s enumeration of powers does not presuppose 
something not enumerated, and that there never will be a distinction between 
what is truly national and what is truly local.”248 In the same spirit, the Court 
rejected the government’s assertion that gun possession near schools affects 
interstate commerce by noting that “if we were to accept the Government’s 
arguments, we [would be] hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual 
that Congress is without power to regulate.”249 Likewise, in Morrison, the Court 
reaffirmed that “even under our modern, expansive interpretation of the 
Commerce Clause, Congress’ regulatory authority is not without effective 
bounds.”250 What’s more, the Court went out of its way to make clear that 
these “bounds” were meant to be judicially enforceable, asserting that “[u]nder 
our written Constitution, … the limitation of congressional authority is not 
solely a matter of legislative grace.”251 
A view of the interstate commerce power as plenary or judicially 
unconstrained may well provide the best explanation for the decision of the 
four Lopez/Morrison dissenters to join the majority in Raich. But to explain 
fully the pattern of outcomes on the current Court, we must attempt to 
understand the approach taken by other justices, particularly those who were 
part of the majority in Lopez, Morrison, and Raich: Justices Scalia and 
Kennedy.252 The basis for these justices’ apparent preference for facial review 
in Commerce Clause must be sought in some other rationale. 
 
246 Cf. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 925 (2006) (holding that the Controlled 
Substances Act does not authorize the Attorney General to prohibit the use of federally 
scheduled drugs to perform assisted suicide, in part because “the background principles of our 
federal system … belie the notion that Congress would use such an obscure grant of authority 
to regulate areas traditionally supervised by the States’ police power”). 
247 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. 
248 Id. (citations omitted). 
249 Id. at 564. 
250 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557). 
251 Id. at 616. 
252 The late Chief Justice Rehnquist, the retired Justice O’Connor, and Justice 
Thomas were all willing to entertain an as-applied challenge in Raich. It is too early to predict 
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D.  Commerce Clause review as overbreadth review. 
Perhaps what looks like facial adjudication in the Commerce Clause 
area is really just a version of traditional overbreadth review.  On this view, 
when the Court facially invalidates statutes as exceeding the commerce 
power—even when the claimant’s activity itself is federally regulable—it does 
so because an unacceptably large proportion of the activities regulated by the 
challenged statute lies beyond the reach of that power.   
The idea that existing Commerce Clause doctrine incorporates an 
overbreadth component has some appeal.253 By embracing such an idea, one 
could concede that much of the Court’s recent jurisprudence (e.g., Lopez and 
Morrison) has a facial cast, while denying that the Court has entertained valid-
rule facial challenges in this area.  One might argue, for example, that the 
Court never asked whether Alfonzo Lopez’s gun had traveled in interstate 
commerce because, even if his particular transaction was regulable, an 
unacceptably large proportion of the transactions covered by the Gun-Free 
School Zones Act were not.  By the same token, it could be argued, even if 
some acts of gender-based violence involve interstate travel or substantially 
affect interstate commerce, the outcome in Morrison was grounded in the 
judgment that the large majority of assaults on women have no such nexus to 
interstate commerce.  Moreover, the Court’s emphasis of late on the curative 
powers of statutory jurisdictional elements dovetails nicely with an 
overbreadth conception of Commerce Clause: the jurisdictional element 
ensures that the scope of federal regulation is precisely coterminous with the 
class of validly regulable activities. 
An overbreadth conception of Commerce Clause review gains some 
additional plausibility from the Court’s recent cases involving Congress’s 
enforcement authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  In the 
1997 case of City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court embarked on a new approach to 
determining whether federal legislation is a valid exercise of Congress’s Section 
5 authority “to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of [the 
Fourteenth Amendment].”254 Such legislation, the Court held, may remedy or 
prevent conduct that does not itself violate the Fourteenth Amendment, but 
 
the approach of Chief Justice Roberts or Justice Alito, but even if their views were to track 
those of their predecessors, there does not appear to be a majority on the Court in favor of as-
applied review in Commerce Clause cases. 
253 As early as Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824), the Supreme Court confronted 
the question of overbreadth in the context of a challenge to state legislative power.  Id. at 102.  
The Court, however, did not directly endorse this contention, choosing instead to strike down 
the New York statute on its face as incompatible with federal statute law under the Supremacy 
Clause. 
254 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
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may not alter the substantive content of constitutional rights.255 To implement 
this new approach, the Court announced a new doctrinal test: “There must be 
a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or 
remedied and the means adopted to that end.”256 The Court soon set about 
applying this “congruence and proportionality” test to invalidate several 
federal statutes (and statutory provisions purporting to abrogate state 
sovereign immunity).257 These were facial invalidations: the Court did not look 
to the particular facts of the claimant’s case, but proceeded by identifying the 
constitutional right Congress sought to enforce, determining whether 
Congress had assembled a record detailing a pattern of state violations of the 
right, and then determining whether the challenged statute was a congruent 
and proportional response to that pattern.258 
The congruence and proportionality test does not lend itself to easy or 
precise categorization, but it seems best to view it as a species of narrow 
tailoring or overbreadth test.259 Thus, for example, in Boerne the Court stated 
that “[p]reventive measures prohibiting certain types of laws may be 
appropriate when there is reason to believe that many of the laws affected by 
the congressional enactment have a significant likelihood of being 
unconstitutional,”260 and that in light of this requirement, the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act’s “sweeping coverage” doomed it to facial 
invalidation.261 This reasoning was repeated in subsequent cases, as the Court 
 
255 Id. at 518-19. 
256 Id. at 520. 
257 See id. at 529-36 (applying the congruence and proportionality test to invalidate 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as applied to state and local government action); Fla. 
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (invalidating 
provision of Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act); Coll. Sav. Bank v. 
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (invalidating provision of 
Trademark Remedy Clarification Act); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) 
(invalidating provision of Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619-
27 (invalidating civil remedy provision of VAWA); Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) 
(invalidating provision of Americans with Disabilities Act). 
258 See Metzger, supra note 20, at 875. 
259 See Sabri, 541 U.S. at 609-10 (characterizing Boerne as an overbreadth case); 
Metzger, supra note 20, at 917 (“The fact that the test represents a form of narrow tailoring 
may justify deviating from the presumption of severability at least insofar as to require courts 
to entertain what are in essence facial overbreadth challenges.”); Catherine Carroll, Note, Section 
Five Overbreadth: The Facial Approach to Adjudicating Challenges Under Section Five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1026 (2003).  
260 521 U.S. at 532. 
261 Id.
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invalidated the Patent Remedy Act in light of its “indiscriminate scope,”262 held 
that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act “prohibits substantially more 
state employment decisions and practices than would likely be held 
unconstitutional under the applicable equal protection, rational basis 
standard,”263 and concluded that the duty of reasonable accommodation under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) “far exceeds what is 
constitutionally required.”264 The Court took a facial approach even in its 2003 
decision upholding the Family and Medical Leave Act, paying no heed to the 
specific facts of the case at bar and concluding that the Act’s remedy—though 
“prophylactic,” i.e., broader than the underlying constitutional violation—did 
not sweep so broadly as to exceed Congress’s Section 5 authority.265 To be 
sure, the overbreadth model of Section 5 adjudication has a more difficult time 
accounting for the Court’s more recent decisions in Tennessee v. Lane266 and 
United States v. Georgia,267 which upheld Title II of the ADA as applied.  Even 
these decisions, however, can be squared with the overbreadth model—so 
long as we make the assumption, as the Court apparently did in Lane, that 
federal legislation may be divided for purposes of Section 5 review into 
“subrules” that are differentiated by the constitutional right each subrule 
purports to enforce and then tested for overbreadth on a subrule-by-subrule 
basis.268 
To make the overbreadth approach to Commerce Clause adjudication 
maximally plausible, imagine a federal statute that simply criminalizes murder.  
Imagine further that a federal poultry inspector has been killed in the line of 
duty, and that the killer is charged with violating the general federal murder 
statute.  Congress undoubtedly has the power under the Necessary and Proper 
 
262 Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 647. 
263 Kimel, 528 U.S. at 86. 
264 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 372. 
265 Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728-40 (2003); cf. Metzger, 
supra note 20, at 896-97 (concluding that Hibbs has a facial cast, though denying that the 
Court’s cases preclude as-applied treatment of Section 5 challenges). 
266 541 U.S. 509 (2004). 
267 126 S. Ct. 877 (2006). 
268 541 U.S. at 530 & n.18 (asserting that the Title II of the ADA need not be 
considered “as an undifferentiated whole,” but rather that its validity may be assessed insofar 
as it purports to enforce the constitutional right of access to the courts); see also Georgia, 126 S. 
Ct. at 882 (emphasizing that Title II is valid insofar as it creates a remedy “for conduct that 
actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment”) (emphasis in original); cf. Fallon, As-Applied,
supra note 95, at 1357-58.   But see Metzger, supra note 20, at 897 n.114 (dismissing the Court’s 
attempt in Lane to distinguish its facial-review precedents as “not particularly persuasive”). 
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Clause to protect federal officials in the discharge of their duties by imposing 
criminal penalties on those who kill them.269 Yet, on the strength of Lopez and 
Morrison, it seems virtually certain that our hypothetical defendant could 
successfully challenge the facial validity of the general federal murder statute, 
notwithstanding the fact that he happened to commit a crime that could have 
been regulated by a more narrowly drawn law. 270 
While an overbreadth understanding of the Commerce Clause is 
theoretically conceivable, it is hard to maintain that such an understanding 
provides the soundest explanation for the facial character of the Court’s recent 
decisions.  Lopez and Morrison simply do not read like overbreadth cases.  The 
Court in Lopez makes absolutely no inquiry into whether a substantial 
proportion of the guns carried near schools have traveled in interstate 
commerce; the Court in Morrison pays no attention to whether a substantial 
proportion of violent acts against women affect interstate commerce.  The 
overbreadth characterization is particularly far-fetched with respect to Lopez,
since the large majority of guns do in fact travel in interstate commerce, a fact 
which presumably would have been enough to doom any overbreadth 
 
269 Cf. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890).  The Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, which 
is not a general murder statute, does seem to contemplate treating the killing of a federal 
agency investigator as an aggravating factor in federal death penalty cases.  See 18 
U. S. C. § 3592(c)(14)(D)(iii); John P. Cunningham, Death in the Federal Courts: Expectations and 
Realities of the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 939, 956 (1998) (noting that 
some Members of Congress criticized the inclusion in the 1994 Act of crimes such as murder 
of a federal poultry inspector). 
270 Interestingly, Justice Scalia came to the same conclusion, albeit in a slightly 
different context (a challenge asserting that an administrative agency regulation was facially 
inconsistent with its enabling statute).  His discussion is worth quoting at some length: 
It is one thing to say that a facial challenge to a regulation that omits statutory 
element x must be rejected if there is any set of facts on which the statute does not 
require x.  It is something quite different—and unlike any doctrine of “facial 
challenge” I have ever encountered—to say that the challenge must be rejected if the 
regulation could be applied to a state of facts in which element x happens to be 
present.  On this analysis, the only regulation susceptible to facial attack is one that 
not only is invalid in all its applications, but also does not sweep up any person who 
could have been held liable under a proper application of the statute.  That is not the 
law.  Suppose a statute that prohibits “premeditated killing of a human being,” and an 
implementing regulation that prohibits “killing a human being.” A facial challenge to 
the regulation would not be rejected on the ground that, after all, it could be applied 
to a killing that happened to be premeditated.  It could not be applied to such a 
killing, because it does not require the factfinder to find premeditation, as the statute 
requires. 
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 731-32 (1995) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting).  For an illuminating discussion of facial challenges to the validity of regulations 
vis-à-vis authorizing statutes, see Buck, supra note 21. 
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challenge in that case.271 The problem with such statutes, in the view of the 
Court majority, is that they are simply not the kind of law that the Commerce 
Clause authorizes Congress to enact.  Even our hypothetical federal murder 
statute, though almost certainly invalid under Lopez and Morrison, would be 
invalid not because it would sweep too broadly in its applications, but because 
the Court would not deem a prohibition of murder to be the kind of law that 
counts as a regulation of interstate commerce.272 Conversely, the claimants in 
Raich may have demonstrated that their activities, taken alone, could not be 
made the subject of a narrow, single-subject federal prohibition, but they 
rightly did not argue that the statute as a whole was unduly overbroad.273 On 
the contrary, the breadth of the Controlled Substances Act turned out to be 
what saved it from invalidation; as Justice O’Connor suggested in her dissent, 
judging from the Court’s analysis in Raich, the constitutional flaw in the 
statutes that were struck down in Lopez and Morrison was one of 
“underbreadth,” not overbreadth.274 In short, the Court approaches the 
Commerce Clause from the perspective not of the overbreadth facial challenge 
but of the valid-rule facial challenge. The next Subpart explains why. 
E.  The Commerce Clause and the requirement of appropriate 
legislative purpose. 
Ultimately, a judicial concern with legislative purpose provides the 
most plausible explanation of the facial character of the Court’s recent 
Commerce Clause cases.  To be sure, in the Commerce Clause context, inquiry 
into legislative purpose is not prominent on the surface of the Court’s 
doctrine.  Instead, that inquiry—more specifically, a judicial concern with the 
 
271 See supra note 58. 
272 Cf. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 428, 443 (1821) (casting doubt on the notion 
that Congress has general authority to punish felonies, particularly murder, within the states); 
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618 (2000) (same). 
273 In addition, if Commerce Clause overbreadth review existed, and the Court 
applied its threshold rule from First Amendment overbreadth cases, the Raich claimants would 
not be permitted simultaneously to argue that their own conduct was constitutionally 
unregulable by Congress and that the statute as a whole was unduly overbroad.  See Brockett v. 
Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503 (1985). 
274 See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2221 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court announces a 
rule that gives Congress a perverse incentive to legislate broadly pursuant to the Commerce 
Clause—nestling questionable assertions of its authority into comprehensive regulatory 
schemes—rather than with precision.”).  See generally Adrian Vermeule, Does Commerce Clause 
Review Have Perverse Effects?, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1325 (2001) [hereinafter Vermeule, Perverse Effects]
(arguing that the Court’s emerging Commerce Clause jurisprudence disserves the values of 
federalism by encouraging broad federal regulation).  I am grateful to Jonathan Masur for 
alerting me to the “underbreadth” coinage.  Cf. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 402 (White, J., concurring) 
(accusing the majority of inventing a doctrine of “underbreadth”). 
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ends or aims of the challenged statute as a whole—lies beneath the doctrinal 
surface, informing the Court’s reasoning and guiding the Court toward facial 
dispositions in Commerce Clause cases, validations and invalidations alike. 
All first-year Constitutional Law students learn that the possibility of a 
purpose-based approach to congressional power was outlined by Chief Justice 
Marshall in McCullough v. Maryland: “[S]hould Congress, under the pretext of 
exercising its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not 
entrusted to the government[,] it would become the painful duty of this 
tribunal, should a case requiring such a decision come before it, to say that 
such an act was not the law of the land.”275 Yet those students soon learn that 
the prohibition on pretextual Commerce Clause legislation, having been 
abused by a conservative Supreme Court in cases like Hammer v. Dagenhart,276 
was decisively put to rest in the 1941 case of United States v. Darby.277 The 
Darby Court could hardly have been more definitive: “The motive and purpose 
of a regulation of interstate commerce are matters for the legislative judgment 
upon the exercise of which the Constitution places no restriction and over 
which the courts are given no control.”278 
Moreover, the Court’s rejection of a purpose-based approach to 
Commerce Clause doctrine is consistent with a long tradition of judicial 
skepticism about inquiring into legislative motivation in constitutional cases.  
As long ago as Fletcher v. Peck in 1810, Chief Justice Marshall warned of the 
difficulties entailed by judicial investigation of legislative motivation,279 and the 
Court has since echoed that warning countless times.280 The pitfalls of such an 
approach are by now familiar.  First, determining the subjective motivations 
 
275 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819). 
276 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (striking down a statute prohibiting the interstate transport of 
goods produced using child labor, on the ground that the purpose of the statute was to affect 
the terms and conditions of labor in manufacturing, a subject then deemed outside the scope 
of interstate commerce). 
277 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
278 Id. at 115.  
279 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 130 (1810) (“It may well be doubted how far the validity of 
a law depends upon the motives of its framers, and how far the particular inducements, 
operating on members of the supreme sovereign power of a state, to the formation of a 
contract by that power, are examinable in a court of justice.”). 
280 See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971) (“[I]t is extremely difficult 
for a court to ascertain the motivation, or collection of different motivations, that lie behind a 
legislative enactment.”); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) (“It is a familiar 
principle of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional 
statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive.”); Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 
423, 454-55 (1931). 
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that impelled a legislator to vote for a particular bill is virtually an impossible 
task.281 Second, legislatures are multi-member bodies, so even if a court could 
somehow ascertain the intention of each legislator, aggregating those manifold 
intentions into a single “legislative intent” would amount to a fool’s errand.282 
And third, as John Hart Ely powerfully argued, the search for legislative 
motivation can exacerbate the risk that judges will simply second-guess the 
legislature’s choices and substitute their own preferences for those of the 
political branches.283 Though some scholars in recent years have argued that 
judicial inquiry into legislative motivation is both more common as a 
descriptive matter and more desirable as a normative matter than the standard 
critique would suggest,284 the critique remains a serious one. 
It is not sufficient to derail us here, however, for three reasons.  First, 
the primary burden of this article is to explain, not to justify or defend, the 
Court’s recent turn toward facial review in Commerce Clause cases.  That a 
judicial inquiry into legislative purpose may be chimerical or unwise does not 
disqualify it as a positive account of the Court’s preference for facial review if 
other factors suggest it has explanatory force.  Second, the critique of judicial 
 
281 See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“[D]iscerning the subjective motivation of those enacting [a] statute is, to be honest, almost 
always an impossible task.”) 
282 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 
HARV. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 61, 68 (1994) (“Intent is elusive for a natural person, fictive for a 
collective body.”); cf. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 
265 (1977) (“[I]t is because legislators and administrators are properly concerned with 
balancing numerous competing considerations that courts refrain from reviewing the merits of 
their decisions, absent a showing of arbitrariness or irrationality.”). 
283 See John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 
YALE L.J. 1205, 1214 (1970) (asserting that “only a hopelessly result-oriented judge would be 
able to assert that he knew which was ‘the’ motivation or the ‘dominant’ motivation underlying 
the [anti-draft-card-burning] statute” challenged in United States v. O’Brien).  Ely also argued 
that constitutional invalidation on grounds of improper legislative motivation is often futile, 
because the legislature can respond to such an invalidation by simply re-enacting the same 
statute accompanied by different—or, worse, less candid—statements of purpose.  Id. at 1214-
15. 
284 See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CAL. L. 
REV. 297 (1997) (welcoming the Court’s trend toward increased scrutiny of governmental 
purposes and offering a framework for such scrutiny); Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: 
The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in Constitutional Law, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 711 (1994) (arguing for a 
structural conception of rights in which examination of the government’s reasons for acting 
would become more prominent); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution,
111 HARV. L. REV. 56, 72 (1997) [hereinafter Fallon, Foreword] (“[I]nquiries into purpose are 
familiar in constitutional law, as they are in the moral assessment of human conduct.  In many 
if not most cases, the relevant questions seem entirely straightforward.”). 
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inquiry into legislative motivation gains much of its strength from the 
observation that it is rarely possible to ascribe a single, or even dominant, 
intention to a particular statute.285 But this article does not assert that the 
Court understands the Commerce Clause to impose a requirement of sole or 
primary legislative purpose, only that (broadly speaking) the challenged statute 
have some reasonably plausible commercial purpose.  Third, and most 
important, it is crucial to distinguish between the search for subjective 
legislative motivations (which is indeed highly vulnerable to the critique 
described above) and the more objective quest for legislative purposes, in the 
sense of the aims or goals at which statutes are directed.286 The latter inquiry, 
though not without its own perils, presents a far more familiar and manageable 
task for judges287—and it is the latter that appears to be at work beneath the 
surface of the Court’s recent Commerce Clause cases. 
To be more specific, decisions from Lopez onward suggest that the 
Court views the Constitution as imposing something like the following 
requirement:  A statute enacted pursuant to Congress’s Commerce Clause 
authority must have, as one of its reasonably plausible aims, a purpose to 
directly regulate or substantially affect interstate commerce.288 
285 See Robert A. Schapiro & William W. Buzbee, Unidimensional Federalism: Power and 
Perspective in Commerce Clause Adjudication, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1199, 1235 (2003) (“[L]aws tend 
to have purposes, not a purpose, and to reflect compromises.”). 
286 The discussion here parallels that of Gil Seinfeld’s interesting article, The Possibility 
of Pretext Analysis in Commerce Clause Adjudication, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1251, 1302-03 
(2003), with an important divergence: Seinfeld advocates judicial inquiry into legislative 
purpose in Commerce Clause cases as a normatively attractive road not taken, whereas this 
article asserts as a descriptive matter that a concern with legislative purpose, while not 
prominent on the surface of the Court’s doctrine, has already driven the Court toward facial 
review.  
287 See, e.g., HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC 
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1410-17 (tent. ed. 1958) (advocating 
an influential method of statutory interpretation in which courts determine the objective 
purpose of a statute by examining its text, structure, and history in light of the assumption that 
statutes are the product of reasonable legislators acting reasonably); Edwards, 482 U.S. at 636 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It is possible to discern the objective ‘purpose’ of a statute[,] i.e., the 
public good at which its provisions appear to be directed.”); Printz, 521 U.S. at 932 (“[W]here, 
as here, it is the whole object of the law to direct the functioning of the state executive, and 
hence to compromise the structural framework of dual sovereignty, … a ‘balancing’ analysis is 
inappropriate.”); cf. Fallon, Foreword, supra note 284, at 71-73 (distinguishing between “purpose 
tests” and “aim tests” in constitutional doctrine); John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists 
From Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 71-72 (2006) (describing purpose-based approach 
to statutory interpretation). 
288 Two notes about this admittedly broad-brush sketch of the Court’s likely 
understanding of the Commerce Clause.  First, by “the Court” here I mean the controlling 
bloc of Justices in Lopez and Morrison, particularly Justices Scalia and Kennedy, who tilted the 
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Traces of such an understanding are reflected in several facets of the 
Court’s recent Commerce Clause doctrine.  First, the Lopez Court attempted to 
distinguish Wickard v. Filburn by noting that “[o]ne of the primary purposes” of 
the Agricultural Adjustment Act challenged in Wickard was to stabilize the 
interstate market in wheat by limiting output and increasing price.289 In 
contrast, said the Court, the Gun-Free School Zones Act “is a criminal statute 
that by its terms has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic 
enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms.”290 Similarly, in a 
passage of his Lopez concurrence subsequently quoted by the Court in 
Morrison, Justice Kennedy reasoned that “unlike the earlier cases to come 
before the Court[,] here neither the actors nor their conduct has a commercial 
character, and neither the purposes nor the design of the statute has an evident 
commercial nexus.”291 Second, the Court’s emphasis in Lopez, and to a lesser 
extent in Morrison, on the role of legislative findings concerning the effects of a 
federally regulated activity on interstate commerce reinforces the conclusion 
that a concern with legislative purpose is at work in the Court’s thinking.292 
After all, requiring (or at least strongly encouraging) the legislature to articulate 
the connection between its handiwork and interstate commerce is a fairly 
dependable way for a court to ascertain whether the statute as a whole was 
designed, at least in part, to “get at” economic activities or effects.293 Third, 
perhaps the best evidence that the Court is motivated by an underlying 
concern with legislative purpose is the fact that it adjudicates Commerce 
Clause cases as valid-rule facial challenges.  As noted in Part II, valid-rule facial 
challenges are particularly prominent in areas of constitutional law where 
substantive judicial doctrine directs courts to undertake an examination of 
legislative purpose.294 
balance toward facial validation in Raich. As discussed supra, text accompanying notes 244-
246, the four Lopez/Morrison dissenters probably view the commerce power as plenary or 
judicially unconstrained, and it is too early to pinpoint the views of Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justice Alito.  Second, the phrase “reasonably plausible aims” is meant to exclude commercial 
purposes that are far-fetched or attenuated, such as the government’s theories in Lopez, which 
the Court rejected as requiring the piling of “inference upon inference,” 514 U.S. at 567.  A 
statute’s reasonably plausible aim need not be its sole or primary aim. 
289 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 (quoting Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128). 
290 Id.
291 Id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
292 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615. 
293 Cf. Seinfeld, supra note 286, at 1324-27 (2003) (advocating a requirement of 
congressional findings concerning the commercial purposes served by a statute as a 
normatively attractive way for courts to ensure compliance with the Commerce Clause). 
294 See supra text accompanying note 115. 
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The apparent renewal of interest among the justices in legislative 
purpose under the Commerce Clause has not gone unnoticed.  For example, 
Mitchell Berman suggests that the results in Lopez, Morrison, and the little-
noticed case of Pierce County v. Guillen295—one might now add Raich to this 
list—are consistent with an understanding on the part of the Court’s 
federalism-minded justices that Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate 
activity must be motivated, at least in part, by commercial purposes.296 Other 
scholars have advanced similar views.297 
Yet this article’s primary claim is not that a concern with legislative 
purpose is conspicuous on the surface of the Court’s decisions, but rather that 
such a concern operates beneath the surface of, and helps shape, those 
decisions.  The important and by-now-familiar distinction here is between 
constitutional meaning on the one hand and the doctrine used by courts to 
implement that meaning on the other.298 To say that a majority of justices 
harbor an understanding of the meaning of the Commerce Clause that 
incorporates a requirement of commercial purpose is not to say that judicial 
doctrine will, or should, incorporate that requirement.  There may be very 
good reasons—institutional, evidentiary, or otherwise—to eschew direct 
judicial enforcement of that component of the Clause’s meaning.299 Thus, as 
Berman has argued, although the concept of commercial purpose has not 
 
295 537 U.S. 129 (2003). 
296 See Mitchell N. Berman, Guillen and Gullibility: Piercing the Surface of Commerce Clause 
Doctrine, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1487, 1511-19 (1994) [hereinafter Berman, Gullibility]. 
297 See, e.g., Schapiro & Buzbee, supra note 285, at 1229 (“Recent Commerce Clause 
cases … demonstrate a renewed interest in legislative purpose.”); Michael J. Gerhardt, On 
Revolution and Wetland Regulations, 90 Geo. L. J. 2143, 2163 (“[W]hat seems to matter primarily 
to the Court for purposes of demarcating the scope of congressional authority under the 
Commerce Clause is the law’s objective, rather than the means by which this objective is 
achieved.”); cf. Bhagwat, supra note 284, at 310 n.43 (speculating “that Congress’ lack of 
commercial motivation was relevant to the Court’s conclusion” in Lopez). 
298 There is a voluminous and growing literature on this topic.  For some important 
examples, see, e.g., Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced 
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978); David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic 
Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 190 (1988); Fallon, Foreword, supra note 285; Daryl J. Levinson, 
Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999); Robert C. Post & 
Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the 
Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L. J. 1943 (2003); Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional 
Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1 (2004) [hereinafter Berman, Decision Rules]; Kermit Roosevelt 
III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649 
(2005). 
299 Cf. supra text accompanying notes 279-284 (describing critique of direct judicial 
inquiry into legislative motivation). 
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featured especially prominently in the Court’s Commerce Clause doctrine 
(what Berman calls the Court’s “decision rules”) it plays a large role in the 
federalism-minded justices’ understanding of the meaning of the Commerce 
Clause (what Berman calls the “constitutional operative proposition”).300 
An analogy can be made here to two other areas of constitutional law: 
the Dormant Commerce Clause and the First Amendment.  In both of these 
areas, scholars have persuasively argued that the Court’s understanding of the 
relevant constitutional operative provision incorporates a latent or inchoate 
requirement of appropriate legislative purpose.  Yet in each area, the Court has 
crafted judicial doctrines that sidestep direct inquiry into the purposes 
underlying the challenged statute. 
With respect to the Dormant Commerce Clause, Donald Regan has 
argued that the Court’s decisions, particularly in cases challenging state statutes 
that restrict the movement of goods across state lines, are best explained by a 
principle that outlaws legislation enacted with an impermissible purpose.301 In 
Dormant Commerce Clause cases, this forbidden legislative purpose is 
protectionism, i.e., the desire to improve the competitive position of in-state as 
compared to out-of-state economic actors.302 Regan argues that the doctrinal 
tests used by the Court in this area—including per se rules, presumptions, 
undue burden analyses, and other tests that appear to turn on a balancing of 
interests or effects rather than on a search for legislative motive—are in fact 
best explained by the effort to root out and invalidate statutes enacted for 
protectionist reasons.303 He concludes that the Court sometimes uses non-
purpose-based doctrines, such as balancing tests, as a convenient cover for a 
purpose inquiry, either because the justices are aware of the practical 
 
300 See, e.g., Berman, Gullibility, supra note 296, at 1512 (speculating that “a majority of 
the Supreme Court believes (perhaps inchoately) that the Commerce Clause authorizes 
Congress to regulate intrastate behavior only in order to achieve what I will loosely call 
‘commercial purposes’—a family of ends including, most centrally, promoting economic 
growth and also (perhaps) ameliorating the negative externalities that economic growth 
produces”).  For a full exposition and defense of the distinction between constitutional 
“operative propositions” and doctrinal “decision rules,” see Berman, Decision Rules, supra note 
298; Roosevelt, supra note 298. 
301 Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986).  I am grateful to Brad Joondeph for 
calling the Dormant Commerce Clause parallel to my attention. 
302 Id. at 1094-95. 
303 Id. at 1206-84.  Since the publication of Regan’s article, the Court has become 
more forthright in its use of purposive analysis in Dormant Commerce Clause cases.  See, e.g.,
General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 299 n.12 (1997) (citing Regan’s article and noting 
that “several cases that have purported to apply the undue burden test … arguably turned in 
whole or in part on the discriminatory character of the challenged state regulations”). 
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difficulties of purpose inquiries, because they have expressly disavowed such 
inquiries in the past, or because they do not wish to accuse state officials of 
harboring improper motives.304 
Similarly, Elena Kagan has argued that much of First Amendment law, 
though not explicitly framed in terms of purpose, is designed to identify and 
invalidate laws that are in fact motivated by impermissible governmental 
motives.305 Thus, a wide array of doctrines—including the concept of “low-
value speech,” the deferential treatment of incidental burdens, and even the 
apparent judicial emphasis on the effects of speech regulations—are all in fact 
designed to flush out and invalidate regulations that are based on the 
government’s desire to suppress speech because it disagrees with, disapproves 
of, or is threatened by the ideas espoused by the speaker.306 This doctrinal 
sleight of hand—the use of non-purpose-based doctrine to ferret out illicit 
purposes—is useful because a candidly purpose-based doctrine would 
confront the twin problems of false negatives and false positives: on the one 
hand, impermissible governmental motives are notoriously difficult for 
litigants to prove, and on the other hand, permissible ones are notoriously easy 
for legislatures to feign.307 Kagan uses R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul308 as illustrative 
of this indirect doctrinal concern with governmental purpose in the First 
Amendment area.309 The Court’s recent Commerce Clause decisions show a 
similar legerdemain. 
 
304 Regan, supra note 301, at 1284-87.  Regan goes further and suggests that an inquiry 
into purpose (which he calls “motive”) may be generally appropriate in cases testing the outer 
limits of governmental authority.  See id. at 1144 (“From the point of view of the constitution-
writer, who is attempting to define for herself, in abstraction from particular legislative 
problems, what the legislature ought and ought not to be able to do, it turns out that in some 
areas motive is precisely the crucial variable.”). 
305 Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First 
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 415 (1996). 
306 Id. at 428. 
307 Id. at 440. 
308 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
309 Kagan, supra note 305, at 422 (“[H]alf hidden beneath a swirl of doctrinal 
formulations, the crux of the dispute between the majority and the concurring opinions 
concerned the proper understanding of St. Paul’s motive in enacting its hate-speech law.”). 
Similarly, it has been argued (and the Supreme Court has held on more than one occasion) that 
the narrow-tailoring prong of strict judicial scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, which 
on its face is more concerned with legislative means than legislative ends, in fact serves to 
“smoke out” illegitimate governmental purposes. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 
U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion); Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 1141, 1146 (2005).  
See also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 146 (1980) (“[F]unctionally, special 
scrutiny, in particular its demand for an essentially perfect fit, turns out to be a way of ‘flushing 
Facial Challenges and the Commerce Clause  
 
61
Three objections could be raised to this article’s account of the Court’s 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence as reflecting an underlying concern with 
legislative purpose.  The first objection is descriptive in character.  According 
to this objection, the facial cast of the Court’s recent cases is not explained by 
some subterranean concern with legislative purpose, but by concepts that 
appear on the very surface of the cases themselves: substantial effects, 
aggregation, and the idea of the comprehensive regulatory scheme, possibly 
complemented by the Necessary and Proper Clause.  Intrastate economic 
activities may be regulated by Congress if, when aggregated, they have a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce; intrastate non-economic activities 
may also be reached if doing so is essential to a comprehensive federal 
regulatory scheme.  The statute at issue in Wickard was upheld because it 
satisfied the first of these criteria, the statute in Raich because it satisfied the 
second, and the statutes in Lopez and Morrison were struck down because they 
satisfied neither.  End of story. 
My first response to this objection is to demur.  At the broadest level, a 
primary objective of this article has been to show that the choice between as-
applied and facial review turns on the nature and content of the applicable 
substantive constitutional doctrine rather than on questions of severability or 
the framing of the claimant’s request for relief.  If the reader is convinced that 
the Court has turned of late to facial review in Commerce Clause cases and 
that substantive judicial doctrine is responsible for the turn, then that objective 
has been fulfilled.  My second and narrower response, however, is to suggest 
that the objection is question-begging, and fails to account adequately for the 
facial character of the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence.  Why did the 
fact that the prohibition on intrastate, noncommercial medical marijuana use 
was part of a larger regulatory scheme suffice to thwart an as-applied 
challenge?  More tellingly, why was the Gun-Free School Zones Act invalidated 
on its face, and not merely as applied to Alfonzo Lopez?  Even if one accepts 
that Congress cannot regulate noncommercial, intrastate activity where the 
regulation is not part of a comprehensive scheme, it remains to be explained 
why such a regulation should be struck down on its face. Surely, from the 
perspective of the values of federalism and judicial restraint, there are sound 
reasons for favoring an as-applied approach.310 The answer, I have suggested, 
 
out’ unconstitutional motivation.”); but see Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L. J. 427 
(1997). 
310 See, e.g., Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2221 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“This case exemplifies 
the role of States as laboratories.”); Vermeule, Perverse Effects, supra note 274; cf. Thomas W. 
Merrill, Rescuing Federalism After Raich: The Case for Clear Statement Rules, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 823 (2005) (criticizing the Court’s use of prohibitory limitations in Commerce Clause 
cases and advocating the essentially as-applied mechanism of the clear statement rule). 
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is that the Court views Commerce Clause challenges as valid-rule facial 
challenges, grounded in the notion that the challenged statute as a whole must 
have a permissible regulatory purpose. 
The second objection is normative in character.  Even if a purpose-
based account of the Commerce Clause has some descriptive force in 
explaining the Court’s recent turn to facial review, the objection runs, such an 
understanding is normatively disastrous.311 Putting to one side the practical 
problems of proof and comparative institutional competence associated with a 
purpose inquiry,312 the reinvigoration of a purpose-based approach to the 
Commerce Clause could cast the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Endangered 
Species Act, and countless other vital federal regulatory statutes into serious 
constitutional doubt.313 
This normative objection is serious.  Because this article has primarily 
descriptive aims, I will address it only briefly here by making three points.  
First, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between constitutional 
meaning and constitutional doctrine.  This article has shown that a controlling 
bloc of justices understands the meaning of the Commerce Clause to 
incorporate a legislative purpose component, not that the Court’s judicial 
doctrine directly incorporates a requirement of legitimate purpose.314 Current 
doctrine, which focuses on the nature and effects of the regulated activity, can 
accommodate the Civil Rights Act, the Endangered Species Act, and other 
landmark federal laws with relative ease.315 Second, even at the level of 
 
311 See, e.g., Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1073 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 
(warning of the disadvantages of an emphasis on purpose in Commerce Clause review).   
312 See supra text accompanying notes 279-284. 
313 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 939 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“From an early time in our national history, the Federal Government has used its enumerated 
powers, such as its power to regulate interstate commerce, for the purpose of protecting 
public morality… .”); Roosevelt, supra note 298, at 1694 (“[E]ven when regulated activities 
clearly did substantially affect interstate commerce, Congress was frequently regulating them 
for other reasons—something that, if we take McCulloch’s pretext passage seriously, might be 
unconstitutional.”); Litman & Greenberg, supra note 58, at 939-40 (interpreting Heart of Atlanta 
Motel and McClung to mean “that the Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate 
particular subjects or areas, regardless of its aims”). 
314 Cf. Berman, Gullibility, supra note 296, at 1523-27. 
315 See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. 241 (upholding Civil Rights Act); McClung,
379 U.S. 294 (same); GDF Realty Invs. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2003) (upholding 
ESA); Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d 1062 (same); United States v. Ho, 311 F.3d 589 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(upholding Clean Air Act).  But see Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 391 F.3d 704 (6th 
Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 617 (2005) (presenting questions concerning the scope of the 
Commerce Clause with respect to the Clean Water Act). 
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meaning, this article does not claim that the Court believes the Commerce 
Clause requires the challenged statute to have the sole or primary aim of 
regulating interstate commerce, only that it have some reasonably plausible 
commercial purpose.  Again, statutes such as the Civil Rights Act have no 
difficulty satisfying this looser requirement.316 Third, even if Congress’s 
interstate commerce power were restricted to enacting statutes with a primarily 
commercial purpose, a powerful case can be made that federal civil rights 
statutes prohibiting private acts of discrimination are a valid exercise of 
Congress’s power to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments.317 This would 
of course require the Court to overrule its decision to the contrary in The Civil 
Rights Cases,318 but that seems a small price to pay. 
The final objection is theoretical in character.  The objection runs as 
follows: even if Commerce Clause cases call for valid-rule adjudication, such 
adjudication could in theory address itself to the validity of “subrules,” i.e., 
applications of a statutory rule to subclasses of activities not textually 
differentiated on the face of the challenged statute.  Though this kind of 
review might be described, formally speaking, as “valid-subrule facial review,” 
in practice it would be indistinguishable from as-applied review.319 Such 
review is indeed theoretically possible.  In fact, one can read the dissents in 
Raich and the majority opinions in the Section 5 cases of Lane and Georgia as 
calling for just such an approach.320 For present purposes, however, it suffices 
to note that the Court does not show any inclination toward such “valid-
subrule” review in Commerce Clause cases.  Indeed, Raich appears to stand for 
the proposition that courts should not entertain Commerce Clause challenges 
 
316 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. 241, and McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (upholding 
statutes prohibiting racial and other forms of discrimination in places of public 
accommodation on the ground that Congress could rationally conclude that such 
discrimination burdens interstate commerce, notwithstanding that Congress’s intent may have 
been primarily to address moral ills); Seinfeld, supra note 286, at 1318-19 (observing that the 
Civil Rights Act has multiple aims, including promoting interstate commerce by ensuring 
nondiscriminatory access to it). 
317 Cf., e.g., Deborah Jones Merritt, The Third Translation of the Commerce Clause: 
Congressional Power to Regulate Social Problems, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1206, 1215 (1998) (“It 
would be ennobling—even affirming to those who have suffered from discrimination—if the 
Supreme Court admitted that we now have a national commitment to equality that does not 
countenance discrimination in any corner of the nation. That commitment, not tangential 
effects on the economy, explains congressional action to reduce bias.”). 
318 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (reaffirmed in Morrison, 529 U.S. at 621-25). 
319 Richard Fallon makes a general argument of this kind in response to Matthew 
Adler’s claim that constitutional rights are “rights against rules.”  See Fallon, As-Applied, supra 
note 95, at 1334-35. 
320 See supra text accompanying notes 266-268. 
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to the constitutionality of textually undifferentiated subrules once Congress 
has chosen to legislate more broadly.  The reason, this article suggests, is that 
Commerce Clause doctrine is driven by a concern with legislative purpose, and 
judicial inquiry (direct or indirect) into the purpose underlying such 
undifferentiated subrules would be difficult at best and incoherent at worst. 
CONCLUSION 
This article shows that facial challenges have come to predominate in 
the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence, and concludes that the 
soundest explanation for this development lies in an understanding of the 
meaning of the Clause that incorporates a requirement of permissible 
legislative purpose.  That conclusion, moreover, illustrates two larger lessons 
about contemporary constitutional law. 
First, constitutional meaning is not the same as constitutional doctrine.  
This article has suggested that in the Commerce Clause area, a conception of 
constitutional meaning that includes a requirement of commercial purpose has 
driven the Court toward facial adjudication, but this latent concern with 
purpose has not (yet) left a substantial imprint on the Court’s doctrine.  In 
other areas, such as the Equal Protection Clause and Congress’s Fourteenth 
Amendment enforcement authority, the Court has erred by conflating its 
decision rules with the Constitution’s operative meaning—in short, it has 
treated doctrine as if it were meaning.321 It is more important than ever for 
judges and scholars to bear in mind the difference between the two. 
Second, there is often no fixed dividing line to be drawn between 
substance and procedure in constitutional adjudication.  As this article has 
shown, the choice between facial and as-applied review is not a mere threshold 
matter of procedure or pleading.  Rather, it is inextricably bound up with the 
nature and functioning of applicable substantive constitutional doctrine.  A 
similar merger of substance and procedure is visible in many other areas of 
constitutional law.  To mention a few examples: hardly anyone believes any 
longer in a rigid analytic separation between “rights” and “remedies”;322 it is 
widely accepted that standing requirements—if they can be understood at all—
cannot be understood in isolation from the issues to be adjudicated on the 
merits;323 and the state action requirement, at least in difficult cases, cannot be 
deployed as a workable threshold test absent an inquiry into substantive 
 
321 See, e.g., Roosevelt, supra note 298. 
322 See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 298. 
323 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Standing Injuries, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 37. 
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constitutional doctrine.324 The doctrine-dependent quality of the choice 
between facial and as-applied challenges is just one more instance of the 
permeability of the supposed boundary between constitutional substance and 
procedure. 
 
324 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1699 (2d ed. 1988) 
(“The state action requirement fixes a frame of reference.  The substantive constitutional right 
at issue initially determines the parameters of this frame.”). 
